There are, of course, several reasons for this result. In the first place the reactions of an individual to objects, as displayed in his daily work, are matters of common knowledge and are likely to leave objective and even measurable evidence such as wealth, books, buildings, etc. Reactions to other individuals are more likely to vary with the occasion and with the companion, and are also likely to be deliberately controlled, inhibited or assumed, in the interest of more objective and remote ends. This would mean that whereas in the first case all the judges were dealing with much the same material, in the form of actual products of the traits in question, in the second case they were more or less likely to have in mind rather different reactions or occasions of a more strictly personal character. The problem of the validity of judgments of the various traits was considered in a more detailed way by Norsworthy, from whose account of her inquiry we have already quoted. She chose the traits enumerated by Cattell, and performed several experiments to determine the reliability of judgments of this sort. Thus she had five intimate acquaintances independently grade a sixth person for her possession of these twenty-four traits, on two different occasions several weeks apart. Two things were clearly shown. In the first place the individual judges, in their second trials, did not diverge far from their first ratings. In the second place the double judgments of the five different judges did not diverge far from each other. These two facts "prove that the ratings do stand for some actual quantitative value and are not subject to mere chance. The validity of the judgments, in the sense of their correspondence with the actual character of X is then only a matter of the impartiality of the group of judges." Similar results were found in the judgments of nine members of a college society by five of their comrades, and in the judgments of a teacher by two hundred college students. It was apparent also that judges differ from one another in the general accuracy of their gradings. Some of them agree closely with the consensus of opinion, while others depart, in varying degrees, from the average or correct estimate. It was also seen that, in estimating certain individuals, judges with presumably equal acquaintance with those being judged agreed closely with one another. Other persons had produced quite different impressions on the different judges and this was revealed in the greater divergence of the grades assigned to such persons.