United States -- History -- Revolution, 1775-1783 -- Campaigns; Washington, George, 1732-1799
With full allowance for changes in army and battle formation, tactical
action and armament, as well as greater facilities for the
transportation of troops and army supplies, it remains true that the
relative effect of all these changes upon success in war upon a grand
scale, has not been the modification of those principles of military
science which have shaped battle action and the general conduct of war,
from the earliest period of authentic military history. The formal
“Maxims of Napoleon” were largely derived from his careful study of the
campaigns of Frederick, Hannibal, and Cæsar; and these, with the
principles involved, had specific and sometimes literal illustration in
the eventful operations of the armies of the Hebrew Commonwealth. As a
matter of fact, those early Hebrew experiences were nearly as potential
in shaping the methods of modern generals, as their civil code became
the formative factor in all later civil codes, preëminently those of the
English Common Law. The very best civil, police, and criminal
regulations of modern enactment hold closely to Hebrew antecedents. And
in military lines, the organization of regiments by companies, and the
combinations of regiments as brigades, divisions and corps, still rest
largely upon the same decimal basis; and neither the Roman legion nor
the Grecian phalanx improved upon that basis. Even the Hebrew militia,
or reserves, had such well-established comprehension of the contingency
of the entire nation being called to the field, or subjected to draft,
that as late as the advent of Christ, when he ordered the multitudes to
be seated upon the grass for refreshment, “they seated themselves in
companies of hundreds and fifties.” The sanitary and police regulations
of their camps have never been surpassed, nor their provision for the
cleanliness, health, and comfort of the rank and file. From earliest
childhood they were instructed in their national history and its
glorious achievements, and the whole people rejoiced in the gallant
conduct of any.
Changes in arms, and especially in projectiles, only induced modified
tactical formation and corresponding movements. The division of armies
into a right, centre, and left, with a well-armed and well-trained
reserve, was illustrated in their earliest battle record. The latest
modern formation, which makes of the regiment, by its three battalion
formation, _a miniature brigade_, is chiefly designed to give greater
individual value to the soldier, and not subject compact masses to the
destructive sweep of modern missiles. It also makes the force more
mobile, as well as more comprehensive of territory within its range of
fire. All this, however, is matter of detail and not of substance, in
the scientific conduct of campaigns during a protracted and widely
extended series of operations in the field.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account