United States -- History -- Revolution, 1775-1783 -- Campaigns; Washington, George, 1732-1799
Military science itself is but the art of employing force to vindicate,
or execute, authority. To meet an emergency adequately, wisely, and
successfully, is the expressive logic of personal, municipal, and
military action. The brain power is banded to various shaftings, and the
mental processes may differ by virtue of different applications; but the
prime activities are the same. In military studies, as in all collegiate
or social preparation, the soldier, the lawyer, or the scientist, must
be in the man, and not the necessary product of a certificate or a
diploma. The simplest possible definition of a few terms in military use
will elucidate the narrative as its events develop the War for American
Independence, under the direction of Washington as Commander-in-Chief.
Six cardinal principles are thus stated:
I. STRATEGY.—To secure those combinations which will ensure the highest
possible advantage in the employment of military force.
NOTE.—The strategical principles which controlled the Revolutionary
campaigns, as defined in Chapter X. had their correspondence in
1861–1865, when the Federal right zone, or belt of war, was beyond the
Mississippi River, and the left zone between the Alleghany Mountains
and the Atlantic Ocean. The Confederate forces, with base at Richmond,
commanded an _interior line_ westward, so that the same troops could
be alternatively used against the Federal right, left, and centre,
while the latter must make a long détour to support its advance
southward from the Ohio River. Federal superiority on sea and river
largely contributed to success. American sea-control in 1898, so
suddenly and completely secured, was practically omnipotent in the war
with Spain. The navy, was a substantially equipped force at the start.
The army, had largely to be created, when instantly needed, to meet
the naval advance. Legislation also favored the navy by giving to the
commander-in-chief the services of eminent retired veterans as an
advisory board, while excluding military men of recent active duty
from similar advisory and administrative service.
II. GRAND TACTICS.—To handle that force in the field.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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