Wit and its relation to the unconsciousFreud, Sigmund
Science
Wit and its relation to the unconscious
Freud, Sigmund
Subconsciousness; Wit and humor -- Psychological aspects
Other subjective determinations or favorable conditions for wit-making
are less shrouded in darkness. The motive for the production of harmless
wit is usually the ambitious impulse to display one’s spirit or to “show
off.” It is an impulse comparable to the impulse toward sexual
exhibition. The existence of numerous inhibited impulses whose
suppression retains some weakness produces a state favorable for the
production of tendency-wit. Thus certain single components of the sexual
constitution may appear as motives for wit-formation. A whole series of
obscene witticisms lead one to the conclusion that a person who gives
origin to such wit conceals a desire to exhibit. Persons having a
powerful sadistical component in their sexuality, which is more or less
inhibited in life, are most successful with the tendency-wit of
aggression.
_The Impulse to Impart Wit_
The second fact which impels one to examine the subjective determination
of wit is the common experience that nobody is satisfied with making wit
for himself. Wit-making is inseparably connected with the desire to
impart it; in fact this impulse is so strong that it is often realized
after overcoming strong objections. In the comic, too, one experiences
pleasure by imparting it to another person; but this is not imperative;
one can enjoy the comic alone when one happens on it. Wit, on the other
hand, must be imparted. Apparently the process of wit-formation does not
end with the conception of wit. There remains something which strives to
complete the mysterious process of wit-formation by imparting it.
We cannot conjecture, in the first place, what may have motivated the
impulse to impart wit. But in wit we notice another peculiarity which
again distinguishes it from the comic. If I encounter the latter I can
laugh heartily over it alone; I am naturally pleased if by imparting it
to some one else I make him laugh too. In the case of wit, however,
which occurs to me or which I have made, I cannot laugh over it in spite
of the unmistakable feeling of pleasure which I experience in the
witticism. It is possible that my need to impart the witticism to
another is in some way connected with the resultant laughter, which is
manifest in the other, but denied to me.
But why do I not laugh over my own joke? And what rôle does the other
person play in it?
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account