The first reinforcements for the British army in South Africa to leave England after the tension became acute were three batteries of artillery, which had been ordered out as far back as September 8. Their despatch had been talked of for some months before, but such was the irresolution and timidity of the Cabinet that delay after delay had occurred. Even now, though these guns were most urgently needed, they were not sent out in the fastest procurable transports, but, with a strange neglect of military necessities, were placed on board two comparatively slow ships--the _Zibenghla_ and _Zayathla_. Both cleared on September 25, but instead of being able at once to proceed, were detained by defects in boilers or by heating of the coal in the bunkers. The _Zibenghla_ did not leave the Mersey until October 7; the _Zayathla_, a little more fortunate, got away from Queenstown on September 29. This ill-omened delay is significant in view of later events. Finally the _Zayathla_ reached Capetown on October 25 and the _Zibenghla_ on the 30th, having occupied, in one way and another, 30 to 35 days on a voyage which could have been accomplished with ease by vessels of moderate speed in 20 or 21 days. It is quite clear that those responsible for providing funds--cheapness was alleged as an excuse for selecting such slow vessels--had completely misapprehended the gravity of the crisis, and forgotten Nelson's great saying, _Five minutes make the difference between victory and defeat_. It is impossible with our British system of administration to discover who exactly was to blame, but clearly someone made a very serious mistake. [Illustration: RESERVISTS AT SOUTHAMPTON DOCKS READING THE LATEST NEWS FROM THE FRONT. The alacrity with which the Reservists answered to the call to the colours has already been mentioned (p. 17).] [Illustration: [_Photo by Gregory._ EMBARKATION OF THE NORTHUMBERLAND FUSILIERS AT SOUTHAMPTON.] [Sidenote: [OCT.-NOV. 1899.] [Sidenote: Full notice to the enemy.]