The British army had been so organised and prepared by the War Office and successive Cabinets that no considerable body of men was ready to take the field on immediate notice. An elaborate process had to be gone through before any considerable number of squadrons, batteries, and battalions could leave our shores. The immature boys and raw recruits had to be weeded out and replaced by reservists who had left the colours. To call up the reservists the consent of Parliament was necessary, and to convene Parliament some notice would of course have to be given. The whole system was admirably adapted to ensure our enemies having the very fullest notice and the very fullest warning of our intentions; and, as has been seen already, the Boers were not slow to take advantage of our ineptitude. How we should have fared in like circumstances against a European enemy must be left to conjecture. There would have been no such lethargy as the Boers displayed in the first week of war. [Illustration: [_Photo by Gregory._ OFF! S.S. _German_ with 1st Battalion Rifle Brigade leaving Southampton.] Had the mobilisation been completed, as many urged, in May or June, the Boers could not have gained a month's start, since in May and June the grass upon the veldt is too scanty to permit of extensive movements. They could not well open their campaign until October, when the first heavy rains fall. Yet in the end it may be that the Boers were defeated by our own unsuspiciousness. Had our Army Corps been sent out in May or June the Republics would have "climbed down," Britain would have once more gone to sleep, and Mr. Kruger would have waited till we were entangled in hostilities with some great power, and then have struck us with terrible effect. [Illustration: Rt. Hon. G. J. Goschen. Marquis of Lansdowne. Marquis of Salisbury. Duke of Devonshire. Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour. THE COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL DEFENCE.] [Sidenote: OCT.-NOV. 1899.] _Strength of the Army Corps._] [Sidenote: Mobilisation begins.] The order to mobilise was issued on October 7, but the mobilisation did not officially begin till the 9th. There was--indeed there could be--no hurry over the operation, for transports were not ready, but had to be prepared as rapidly as possible. The total force which it was decided to despatch was as follows:-- Nom. Fighting strength. strength. Guns. 1 Cavalry Division 5,500 4,820 12 3 Infantry Divisions 30,000 26,430 54 Corps Troops 5,000 3,450 48 Line of Communications and Reserves 11,000 11,000 -- ------- ------- --- 51,500 45,700 114 [Illustration: