Compare Analyt. Poster. II. xix. pp. 99, 100, where the same doctrine occurs: the movement of association is stopped, and the mind is determined to dwell upon a certain idea; one among an aggregate of runaways being arrested in flight, another halts also, and so the rest in succession, until at length the Universal, or the sum total, is detained, or "stands still" as an object of attention. Also Aristot. Problem. p. 956, b. 39.] [Footnote 7: Aristot. De Interpr. p. 16, b. 2, seq.] Aristotle intimates his opinion, distinctly and even repeatedly, upon the main question debated by Plato in the Kratylus. He lays it down that all significant speech is significant by convention only, and not by nature or as a natural instrument.[8] He tells us also that, in this treatise, he does not mean to treat of all significant speech, but only of that variety which is known as _enunciative_. This last, as declaring truth or falsehood, is the only part belonging to Logic as he conceives it; other modes of speech, the precative, imperative, interrogative, &c., belong more naturally to Rhetoric or Poetic.[9] Enunciative speech may be either simple or complex; it may be one enunciation, declaring one predicate (either in one word or in several words) of one subject; or it may comprise several such.[10] The conjunction of the predicate with the subject constitutes the variety of proposition called Affirmation; the disjunction of the same two is Negation or Denial.[11] But such conjunction or disjunction, operated by the cogitative act, between two mental states, takes place under the condition that, wherever conjunction may be enunciated, there also disjunction may be enunciated, and _vice versâ_. Whatever may be affirmed, it is possible also to deny; whatever may be denied, it is possible also to affirm.[12] [Footnote 8: Ibid. p. 16, a. 26; p. 17, a. 2.] [Footnote 9: Ibid. p. 17, a. 6: [Greek: _o( de\ a)pophantiko\s tê=s nu=n theôri/as_]. See the **Scholion of Ammonius, pp. 95, 96, 108, a. 27. In the last passage, Ammonius refers to a passage in one of the lost works of Theophrastus, wherein that philosopher distinguished [Greek: to\n a)pophantiko\n lo/gon] from the other varieties of [Greek: lo/gos], by the difference of [Greek: sche/sis]: the [Greek: a)pophantiko\s lo/gos] was [Greek: pro\s ta\ pra/gmata], or _objective_; the others were [Greek: pro\s tou\s a)kroôme/nous], _i.e._ varying with the different varieties of hearers, or _subjective_.] [Footnote 10: Ibid. p. 17, a. 25.] [Footnote 11: Ibid. p. 17, a. 25.] [Footnote 12: Ibid. p. 17, a. 30: [Greek: a(/pan a)\n e)nde/choito kai\ o(\ kate/phêse/ tis a)pophê=sai, kai\ o(\ a)pe/phêse/ tis kataphê=sai.]]