We are now to consider upon what the preservation of governments in
general and of each state in particular depends; and, in the first
place, it is evident that if we are right in the causes we have assigned
for their destruction, we know also the means of their preservation; for
things contrary produce contraries: but destruction and preservation are
contrary to each other. In well-tempered governments it requires as much
care as anything whatsoever, that nothing be done contrary to law: and
this ought chiefly to be attended to in matters of small consequence;
for an illegality that approaches insensibly, approaches secretly, as in
a family small expenses continually repeated consume a man's income;
for the understanding is deceived thereby, as by this false argument; if
every part is little, then the whole is little: now, this in one sense
is true, in another is false, for the whole and all the parts together
are large, though made up of small parts. The first therefore of
anything is what the state ought to guard against. In the next place,
no credit ought to be given to those who endeavour to deceive the people
with false pretences; for they will be [1308a] confuted by facts. The
different ways in which they will attempt to do this have been already
mentioned. You may often perceive both aristocracies and oligarchies
continuing firm, not from the stability of their forms of government,
but from the wise conduct of the magistrates, both towards those who
have a part in the management of public affairs, and those also who
have not: towards those who have not, by never injuring them; and also
introducing those who are of most consequence amongst them into office;
nor disgracing those who are desirous of honour; or encroaching on the
property of individuals; towards those who have, by behaving to each
other upon an equality; for that equality which the favourers of a
democracy desire to have established in the state is not only just,
but convenient also, amongst those who are of the same rank: for which
reason, if the administration is in the hands of many, those rules which
are established in democracies will be very useful; as to let no one
continue in office longer than six months: that all those who are of
the same rank may have their turn; for between these there is a sort
of democracy: for which reason demagogues are most likely to arise up
amongst them, as we have already mentioned: besides, by this means both
aristocracies and democracies will be the less liable to be corrupted
into dynasties, because it will not be so easy for those who are
magistrates for a little to do as much mischief as they could in a
long time: for it is from hence that tyrannies arise in democracies
and oligarchies; for either those who are most powerful in each state
establish a tyranny, as the demagogues in the one, the dynasties in the
other, or the chief magistrates who have been long in power. Governments