M. Boeckh, in a discussion of some length (Untersuch. p. 76-84), maintains the opinion that the reading in the first passage of Aristotle is incorrect; that the two words [Greek: i)/llesthai kai\ kinei=sthai] ought to stand in the first as they do in the second,--as he thinks that they stood in the copy of Simplikius: that Aristotle only made reference to Plato with a view to the peculiar word [Greek: i)/llesthai], and not to the general doctrine of the rotation of the earth: that he comments upon this doctrine as held by others, but not by Plato--who (according to Boeckh) was known by everyone not to hold it. M. Boeckh gives this only as a conjecture, and I cannot regard his arguments in support of it as convincing. But even if he had convinced me that [Greek: i)/llesthai kai\ kinei=sthai] were the true reading in the first passage, as well as in the second, I should merely say that Aristotle had not thought himself precluded by the reference to the Timæus from bringing out into explicit enunciation what the Platonists whom he had in view knew to be implied and intended by the passage. This indeed is a loose mode of citation, which I shall not ascribe to Aristotle without good evidence. In the present case such evidence appears to me wanting.[4] [Footnote 4: Exactness of citation is not always to be relied on among ancient commentators. Simplikius cites this very passage of the Timæus with more than one inaccuracy.--(ad Aristot. De Coelo, fol. 125.)] M. Martin attributes to Aristotle something more than improper citation. He says (Êtudes sur le Timée, vol. ii. p. 87), "Si Aristote citait l'opinion de la rotation de la terre comme un titre de gloire pour Platon, je dirais--il est probable que la vérité l'y a forcé. Mais Aristote, qui admettait l'immobilité complète de la terre, attribue à Platon l'opinion contraire, _pour se donner le plaisir de la réfuter avec dédain_." A few lines before, M. Martin had said that the arguments whereby Aristotle combated this opinion ascribed to Plato were "very feeble." I am at a loss to imagine in which of Aristotle's phrases M. Martin finds any trace of disdain or contempt, either for the doctrine or for those who held it. For my part, I find none. The arguments of Aristotle against the doctrine, whatever be their probative force, are delivered in that brief, calm, dry manner which is usual with him, without a word of sentiment or rhetoric, or anything [Greek: e)/xô tou= pra/gmatos]. Indeed, among all philosophers who have written much, I know none who is less open to the reproach of mingling personal sentiment with argumentative debate than Aristotle. Plato indulges frequently in irony, or sneering, or rhetorical invective; Aristotle very rarely. Moreover, even apart from the question of contempt, the part which M. Martin here assumes Aristotle to be playing, is among the strangest anomalies in the history of philosophy. Aristotle holds, and is anxious to demonstrate, the doctrine of the earth's