The Nicomachean ethics of Aristotle — Aristotle — John Shaqi
The Nicomachean ethics of Aristotle
Aristotle · en
Still[26] it is quite plain that it does require the addition of
external goods, as we have said: because without appliances it is
impossible, or at all events not easy, to do noble actions: for
friends, money, and political influence are in a manner instruments
whereby many things are done: some things there are again a deficiency
in which mars blessedness; good birth, for instance, or fine offspring,
or even personal beauty: for he is not at all capable of Happiness who
is very ugly, or is ill-born, or solitary and childless; and still less
perhaps supposing him to have very bad children or friends, or to have
lost good ones by death. As we have said already, the addition of
prosperity of this kind does seem necessary to complete the idea of
Happiness; hence some rank good fortune, and others virtue, with
Happiness.
Chapter VII.
And hence too a question is raised, whether it is a thing that can be
learned, or acquired by habituation or discipline of some other kind,
or whether it comes in the way of divine dispensation, or even in the
way of chance.
Now to be sure, if anything else is a gift of the Gods to men, it is
probable that Happiness is a gift of theirs too, and specially because
of all human goods it is the highest. But this, it may be, is a
question belonging more properly to an investigation different from
ours:[27] and it is quite clear, that on the supposition of its not
being sent from the Gods direct, but coming to us by reason of virtue
and learning of a certain kind, or discipline, it is yet one of the
most Godlike things; because the prize and End of virtue is manifestly
somewhat most excellent, nay divine and blessed.
It will also on this supposition be widely participated, for it may
through learning and diligence of a certain kind exist in all who have
not been maimed[28] for virtue.
And if it is better we should be happy thus than as a result of chance,
this is in itself an argument that the case is so; because those things
which are in the way of nature, and in like manner of art, and of every
cause, and specially the best cause, are by nature in the best way
possible: to leave them to chance what is greatest and most noble would
be very much out of harmony with all these facts.[29]
The question may be determined also by a reference to our definition of
Happiness, that it is a working of the soul in the way of excellence or
virtue of a certain kind: and of the other goods, some we must have to
begin with, and those which are co-operative and useful are given by
nature as instruments.[30]
These considerations will harmonise also with what we said at the
commencement: for we assumed the End of πολιτικὴ to be most excellent:
now this bestows most care on making the members of the community of a
certain character; good that is and apt to do what is honourable.