The Nicomachean ethics of Aristotle — Aristotle — John Shaqi
The Nicomachean ethics of Aristotle
Aristotle · en
And if, as we have said, the acts of working are what determine the
character of the life, no one of the blessed can ever become wretched,
because he will never do those things which are hateful and mean. For
the man who is truly good and sensible bears all fortunes, we presume,
becomingly, and always does what is noblest under the circumstances,
just as a good general employs to the best advantage the force he has
with him; or a good shoemaker makes the handsomest shoe he can out of
the leather which has been given him; and all other good artisans
likewise. And if this be so, wretched never can the happy man come to
be: I do not mean to say he will be blessed should he fall into
fortunes like those of Priam.
Nor, in truth, is he shifting and easily changeable, for on the one
hand from his happiness he will not be shaken easily nor by ordinary
mischances, but, if at all, by those which are great and numerous; and,
on the other, after such mischances he cannot regain his happiness in a
little time; but, if at all, in a long and complete period, during
which he has made himself master of great and noble things.
Why then should we not call happy the man who works in the way of
perfect virtue, and is furnished with external goods sufficient for
acting his part in the drama of life:[35] and this during no ordinary
period but such as constitutes a complete life as we have been
describing it.
Or we must add, that not only is he to live so, but his death must be
in keeping with such life, since the future is dark to us, and
Happiness we assume to be in every way an end and complete. And, if
this be so, we shall call them among the living blessed who have and
will have the things specified, but blessed _as Men_.[36]
On these points then let it suffice to have denned thus much.
Chapter IX.
Now that the fortunes of their descendants, and friends generally,
contribute nothing towards forming the condition of the dead, is
plainly a very heartless notion, and contrary to the current opinions.
But since things which befall are many, and differ in all kinds of
ways, and some touch more nearly, others less, to go into minute
particular distinctions would evidently be a long and endless task: and
so it may suffice to speak generally and in outline.