There would be nothing bad in the World, if all that pleas'd were good; for there is nothing so ridiculous, but what will have its Admirers. You may say indeed, 'tis no truer, that what is good pleases, because we see ev'ry day Disputes about the Good and Pleasant, that the same Thing pleases some, and displeases others; nay, it pleases and displeases the very same Persons at different times: from whence then proceeds this difference? It comes either from an absolute Ignorance of the Rule, or that the Passions alter it. Rightly to clear this Truth, I believe I may lay down this Maxim, that all sensible Objects are of two sorts; some may be judged of, by Sense independantly from Reason. I can Sense that Impression which the animal Spirits make on the Soul, others can't be judged of but by Reason exercised in Science, Things simply agreeable, or disagreeable, are of the first Sort, all the World may judge alike of these, for example the most Ignorant in Musick, perceives very well, when a Player on the Lute strikes one String for another, because he judges by his Sense, and that Sense is the Rule; in such occasions, we may therefore very well say, that all that pleases is good, because that which is Good doth please, or that which is Evil never fails to displease; for neither the Passions, nor Ignorance dull the Senses, on the contrary they sharpen them. 'Tis not so in Things which spring from Reason; Passion and Ignorance act very strongly on it, and oftentimes choak it, this is the Reason, why we ordinarily judge so ill, and differently concerning those Things, of which, that is the Rule and the Cause. Why, what is Bad often pleases, and that which is Good doth not always so, 'tis not the fault of the Object, 'tis the fault of him who judges; but what is Good will infallibly please those who can judge, and that's sufficient. By this we may see, that a Play, that shall bring those Things which are to be judg'd of by Reason, within the Rules, as also what is to be judg'd of by the Sense, shall never fail to please, for it will please both the Learned, and Ignorant: Now this Conformity of suffrages is the most sure,[19] or according to _Aristotle_ the only Mark of the Good, and Pleasant, as he proves in the following part of his Discourse. Now these Suffrages are not obtained, but by the observation of the Rules, and consequently, these Rules are the only Cause of the Good, and Pleasant, whether they are follow'd Methodically and with Design, or by Hazard only; for 'tis certain, there are many Persons who are entirely Ignorant of these Rules, and yet don't fail to succeed in several Affairs: This is far from destroying the Rules, and serves to shew their Beauty, and proves how far they are conformable to Nature, since those often follow them, who know nothing of 'em. In the Remarks you shall find many Examples of the vast difference, the observance or neglect of the Rules make in the same Subject, and by that