the laws are not ordered for the legislator, but he for them;[185] as also the Philosopher holds, in what he has left us on the present subject. Hence, too, it is clear that although the king or the consul rule over the other citizens in respect of the means[186] of government, yet in respect of the end of government they are the servants of the citizens, and especially the Monarch, who, without doubt, must be held the servant of all. Thus it becomes clear that the Monarch is bound by the end appointed to himself in making his laws. Therefore mankind is best off under a Monarchy, and hence it follows that Monarchy is necessary for the welfare of the world. [Footnote 179: "_Felicitamur._"] [Footnote 180: "_Ut Dii_;" cf. _Paradiso_, v. 19.--WITTE.] [Footnote 181: _I.e._ _Metaphys._ 1, 2.--(W.)] [Footnote 182: "_Politizant reges._"] [Footnote 183: "_Oblique politizantes._"] [Footnote 184: _Polit._ iii. 4.] [Footnote 185: _Ibid._ iii. 16, 17.--(W.)] [Footnote 186: "_Respectu viæ ... respectu termini._"] XIII.--Further, he who can be best fitted to rule can best fit others. For in every action the main end of the agent, whether acting by necessity of nature or voluntarily, is to unfold his own likeness; and therefore every agent, so far as he is of this sort, delights in action. For since all that is desires its own existence, and since the agent in acting enlarges his own existence in some way, delight follows action of necessity; for delight is inseparable from gaining what is desired. Nothing therefore acts unless it is of such sort as that which is acted on ought to be; therefore the Philosopher said in his _Metaphysics_,[187] "Everything which becomes actual from being potential, becomes so by means of something actual of the same kind," and were anything to try to act in any other way it would fail. Hence we may overthrow the error of those who think to form the moral character of others by speaking well and doing ill; forgetting that the hands of Jacob were more persuasive with his father than his words, though his hands deceived and his voice spake truth. Hence the Philosopher, to Nicomachus: "In matters of feeling and action, words are less to be trusted than deeds."[188] And therefore God said to David in his sin, "What hast thou to do to declare my statutes?" as though He would say, "Thou speakest in vain, for thou art different from what thou speakest." Hence it may be gathered that he needs to be fitted for his work in the best way who wishes to fit others. [Footnote 187: _Metaphys._ ix. 8.--(W.)] [Footnote 188: Arist. _Eth._ x. 1.--(W.)]