Dante. An essay. To which is added a translation of De Monarchia. — Dante Alighieri — John Shaqi
Dante. An essay. To which is added a translation of De Monarchia.
Dante Alighieri · en
But the Monarch is the only one who can be fitted in the best possible
way to govern. Which is thus proved: Each thing is the more easily and
perfectly qualified for any habit, or actual work, the less there is
in it of what is contrary to such a disposition. Therefore, they who
have never even heard of philosophy, arrive at a habit of truth in
philosophy more easily and completely than those who have listened to
it at odd times, and are filled with false opinions. For which reason
Galen well says: "Such as these require double time to acquire
knowledge."[189] A Monarch then has nothing to tempt appetite, or, at
least, less than any other man, as we have shown before; whereas other
princes have much; and appetite is the only corrupter of
righteousness, and the only impediment to justice. A Monarch therefore
is wholly, or at least more than any other prince, disposed to govern
well: for in him there may be judgment and justice more strongly than
in any other. But these two things are the pre-eminent attributes of a
maker of law, and of an executor of law, as that most holy king David
testified when he asked of God the things which were befitting the
king, and the king's son, saying: "Give the king thy judgment, O God,
and thy righteousness unto the king's son."[190]
[Footnote 189: _De cognosc. animi morbis_, c. 10.--WITTE.]
[Footnote 190: Cf. _Parad._ xiii. 95.--(W.)]
We were right then when we assumed that only the Monarch can be best
fitted to rule. Therefore only the Monarch can in the best way fit
other men. Therefore it follows that Monarchy is necessary for the
best ordering of the world.
XIV.--And where a thing can be done by one agent, it is better to do
it by one than by several, for this reason: Let it be possible to do a
certain thing by means of A, and also by means of A and B. If
therefore what is done by A and B can be done by A alone, it is
useless to add B; for nothing follows from the addition; for the same
end which A and B produced is produced also by A. All additions of
this kind are useless and superfluous: all that is superfluous is
displeasing to God and Nature: and all that is displeasing to God and
Nature is bad, as is manifest. It therefore follows not only that it
is better that a thing should be done by one than by many agents, if
it is possible to produce the effect by one; but also that to produce
the effect by one is good, and to produce it by many is simply bad.
Again, a thing is said to be better by being nearer to the best, and
the end has the nature of the best. But for a thing to be done by one
agent is better, for so it comes nearer to the end. And that so it
comes nearer is manifest; for let C be the end which may be reached by
A, or by A and B together: plainly it is longer to reach C by A and B
together than by B alone. But mankind may be governed by one supreme
prince, who is, the Monarch.