Hence it is apparent that, since all Right[203] is good, it therefore exists first in the mind of God; and since all that is in the mind of God is God, according to the saying, "What was made, in Him was life;"[204] and as God chiefly wishes for what is Himself, it follows that Right is the wish of God, so far as it is in Him. And since in God the will and the wish are the same, it further follows that this Right is the will of God. Again it follows that Right in the world is nothing else than the likeness of the will of God, and therefore whatever does not agree with the divine will cannot be Right, and whatever does agree with the divine will is Right itself. Therefore to ask if a thing be by Right is only to ask in other words if it is what God wills. It may therefore be assumed that what God wills to see in mankind is to be held as real and true Right. [Footnote 203: "_Jus._"] [Footnote 204: St. John i. 3.--(W.)] Besides we must remember Aristotle's teaching in the first book of his _Ethics_, where he says: "We must not seek for certitude in every matter, but only as far as the nature of the subject admits."[205] Therefore our arguments from the first principle already found will be sufficient, if from manifest evidence and from the authority of the wise, we seek for the right of that glorious people. The will of God is an invisible thing, but "the invisible things of God are seen, being understood by the things which are made." For when the seal is out of sight, the wax, which has its impression, gives manifest evidence of it, though it be unseen; nor is it strange that the will of God must be sought by signs; for the human will, except to the person himself who wills, is only discerned by signs.[206] [Footnote 205: _Eth._ i. 7, from Thom. Aq. _Lect._ XI.--(W.)] [Footnote 206: The image of the wax and seal was a favourite one. V. _Parad._ vii. 68, viii. 127, xiii. 67-75, quoted by Witte, who also refers to the _Epist. ad Reges_, § 8, p. 444, ed. Fraticelli.] III.--My answer then to the question is, that it was by right, and not by usurpation, that the Roman people assumed to itself the office of Monarchy, or, as men call it, the Empire, over all mankind. For in the first place it is fitting that the noblest people should be preferred to all others; the Roman people was the noblest; therefore it is fitting that it should be preferred to all others. By this reasoning I make my proof; for since honour is the reward of goodness, and since to be preferred is always honour, therefore to be preferred is always the reward of goodness. It is plain that men are ennobled for their virtues; that is, for their own virtues or for those of their ancestors; for nobleness is virtue and ancestral wealth, according to Aristotle in his Politics; and according to Juvenal, "There is no nobleness of soul but virtue,"[207] which two statements refer to two sorts of nobleness, our own and that of our ancestors.[208]