Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting One's Reason and of Seeking Truth in the Sciences — Descartes — John Shaqi
Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting One's Reason and of Seeking Truth in the Sciences
Descartes · en
For my own part, I should doubtless have belonged to the latter class,
had I received instruction from but one master, or had I never known
the diversities of opinion that from time immemorial have prevailed
among men of the greatest learning. But I had become aware, even so
early as during my college life, that no opinion, however absurd and
incredible, can be imagined, which has not been maintained by some on
of the philosophers; and afterwards in the course of my travels I
remarked that all those whose opinions are decidedly repugnant to ours
are not in that account barbarians and savages, but on the contrary
that many of these nations make an equally good, if not better, use of
their reason than we do. I took into account also the very different
character which a person brought up from infancy in France or Germany
exhibits, from that which, with the same mind originally, this
individual would have possessed had he lived always among the Chinese
or with savages, and the circumstance that in dress itself the fashion
which pleased us ten years ago, and which may again, perhaps, be
received into favor before ten years have gone, appears to us at this
moment extravagant and ridiculous. I was thus led to infer that the
ground of our opinions is far more custom and example than any certain
knowledge. And, finally, although such be the ground of our opinions, I
remarked that a plurality of suffrages is no guarantee of truth where
it is at all of difficult discovery, as in such cases it is much more
likely that it will be found by one than by many. I could, however,
select from the crowd no one whose opinions seemed worthy of
preference, and thus I found myself constrained, as it were, to use my
own reason in the conduct of my life.
But like one walking alone and in the dark, I resolved to proceed so
slowly and with such circumspection, that if I did not advance far, I
would at least guard against falling. I did not even choose to dismiss
summarily any of the opinions that had crept into my belief without
having been introduced by reason, but first of all took sufficient time
carefully to satisfy myself of the general nature of the task I was
setting myself, and ascertain the true method by which to arrive at the
knowledge of whatever lay within the compass of my powers.