Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume 1 (of 3) — Georg Hegel — John Shaqi
Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume 1 (of 3)
Georg Hegel · en
To come back to Heraclitus, there is only one thing wanting to the
process, which is that its simple principle should be recognized as
universal Notion. The permanence and rest which Aristotle gives, may be
missed. Heraclitus, indeed, says that everything flows on, that nothing
is existent and only the one remains; but that is the Notion of the
unity which only exists in opposition and not of that reflected within
itself. This one, in its unity with the movement of the individuals,
is the genus, or in its infinitude the simple Notion as thought; as
such, the Idea has still to be determined, and we shall thus find it
again as the _νοῦς_ of Anaxagoras. The universal is the immediate
simple unity in opposition which goes back into itself as a process of
differences; but this is also found in Heraclitus; he called this unity
in opposition Fate (_εἱμαρμένη_) or Necessity.[65] And the Notion of
necessity is none other than this, that determinateness constitutes the
principle of the existent as individual, but in that very way, relates
it to its opposite: this is the absolute “connection (_λόγος_) that
permeates the Being of the whole.” He calls this “the ethereal body,
the seed of the Becoming of everything”;[66] that to him is the Idea,
the universal as reality, as process at rest.
3. _Relation of the Principle to Consciousness._ There is still
something else to consider, and that is what position in this principle
Heraclitus gives to consciousness; his philosophy has, on the whole,
a bent towards a philosophy of nature, for the principle, although
logical, is apprehended as the universal nature-process. How does this
_λόγος_ come to consciousness? How is it related to the individual
soul? I shall explain this here in greater detail: it is a beautiful,
natural, childlike manner of speaking truth of the truth. The universal
and the unity of the principle of consciousness and of the object,
and the necessity of objectivity, make their first appearance here.
Several passages from Heraclitus are preserved respecting his views of
knowledge. From his principle that everything that is, at the same time
is not, it immediately follows that he holds that sensuous certainty
has no truth; for it is the certainty for which something exists as
actual, which is not so in fact. Not this immediate Being, but absolute
mediation, Being as thought of, Thought itself, is the true Being.
Heraclitus in this relation says of sensuous perception—according to
Clement of Alexandria—(Strom. III. 3, p. 520): “What we see waking
is dead, but what we see sleeping, a dream,” and in Sextus (adv.
Math. VII. 126, 127), “Men’s eyes and ears are bad witnesses, for
they have barbarous souls. Reason (_λόγος_) is the judge of truth,
not the arbitrary, but the only divine and universal judge”—this is
the measure, the rhythm, that runs through the Being of everything.
Absolute necessity is just the having the truth in consciousness; but