Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume 1 (of 3) — Georg Hegel — John Shaqi
Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume 1 (of 3)
Georg Hegel · en
These are the doctrines of the atomists. We see that we have reached
the extreme limits of these thoughts, for when relation comes into
question, we step beyond them. Being and non-being, as something
thought, which, when represented for consciousness as differing in
regard to one another, are the plenum and the vacuum, have no diversity
in themselves; for the plenum has likewise negativity in itself; as
independent, it excludes what is different; it is one and infinitely
many ones, while the vacuum is not exclusive, but pure continuity. Both
these opposites, the one and continuity, being now settled, nothing is
easier to imagine than that atoms should float in existent continuity,
now being separated and now united; and thus that their union should
be only a superficial relation, or a synthesis that is not determined
through the inherent nature of what is united, but in which these
self-existent beings really remain separated still. But this is an
altogether external relationship; the purely independent is united to
the independent, and thus a mechanical combination alone results. All
that is living, spiritual, &c., is then merely thrown together; and
change, origination, creation, are simple union.
However highly these principles are to be esteemed as a forward step,
they at once reveal to us their total inadequacy, as is also the
case when we enter with them on further concrete determinations.
Nevertheless, we need not add what is in great measure added by the
conception of a later date, that once upon a time, there was a chaos, a
void filled with atoms, which afterwards became united and orderly, and
that the world thereby arose; it is now and ever that what implicitly
exists is the plenum and the vacuum. The satisfying point of view which
natural science found in such thoughts, is just the simple fact that in
these the existent is in its antithesis as what is thought and what is
opposed to thought, and is hereby what exists in and for itself. The
Atomists are therefore, generally speaking, opposed to the idea of the
creation and maintenance of this world by means of a foreign principle.
It is in the theory of atoms that science first feels released from
the sense of having no foundation for the world. For if nature is
represented as created and held together by another, it is conceived
of as not existent in itself, and thus as having its Notion outside
itself, _i.e._ its principle or origin is foreign to it and it has no
principle as such, only being conceivable from the will of another; as
it is, it is contingent, devoid of necessity and Notion in itself. In
the conception of the atomist, however, we have the conception of the
inherency of nature, that is to say, thought finds itself in it, or
its principle is in itself something thought, and the Notion finds its
satisfaction in conceiving and establishing it as Notion. In abstract
existence, nature has its ground in itself and is simply for itself;