Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume 1 (of 3)
Georg Hegel · en
the atom and the vacuum are just such simple Notions. But we cannot
here see or find more than the formal fact that quite general and
simple principles, the antithesis between the one and continuity, are
represented.
If we proceed from a wider, richer point of view in nature, and demand
that from the atomic theory, it, too, must be made comprehensible, the
satisfaction at once disappears and we see the impossibility of getting
any further. Hence we must get beyond these pure thoughts of continuity
and discontinuity. For these negations, the units, are not in and for
themselves; the atoms are indivisible and like themselves, or their
principle is made pure continuity, so that they may be said to come
directly into one clump. The conception certainly keeps them separate
and gives them a sensuously represented Being; but if they are alike,
they are, as pure continuity, the same as what is empty. But that which
is, is concrete and determined. How then can diversity be conceived
of from these principles? Whence comes the determinate character of
plants, colour, form? The point is, that though these atoms as small
particles may be allowed to subsist as independent, their union becomes
merely a combination which is altogether external and accidental. The
determinate difference is missed; the one, as that which is for itself,
loses all its determinateness. If various matters, electrical, magnetic
and luminous, are assumed, and, at the same time, a mechanical shifting
about of molecules, on the one hand unity is quite disregarded, and, on
the other, no rational word is uttered in regard to the transition of
phenomena, but only what is tautological.
Since Leucippus and Democritus wished to go further, the necessity of
a more definite distinction than this superficial one of union and
separation was introduced, and they sought to bring this about by
ascribing diversity to atoms, and, indeed, by making their diversity
infinite. Aristotle (Met. I. 4) says: “This diversity they sought to
determine in three ways. They say that atoms differ in figure, as A
does from N; in order” (place) “as AN from NA; in position”—as to
whether they stand upright or lie—“as Z from N. From these all other
differences must come.” We see that figure, order and posture are again
external relationships, indifferent determinations, _i.e._ unessential
relations which do not affect the nature of the thing in itself nor its
immanent determinateness, for their unity is only in another. Taken on
its own account, this difference is indeed inconsistent, for as the
entirely simple one, the atoms are perfectly alike, and thus any such
diversity cannot come into question.