Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume 1 (of 3)
Georg Hegel · en
There is little more to be made of this. But here we have the beginning
of a more distinct development of the relationship of consciousness to
Being, the development of the nature of knowledge as a knowledge of the
true. The mind has gone forth to express real existence as Thought;
and thus real existence as existent, is in consciousness as such; it
is implicit but likewise in consciousness. This Being is such only in
so far as consciousness recognizes it, and real existence is only the
knowledge of it. The mind has no longer to seek existence in something
foreign, since it is in itself; for what formerly appeared foreign
is Thought, _i.e._ consciousness has this real existence in itself.
But this consciousness in opposition is an individual consciousness;
thereby in fact, implicit Being is sublated, for the implicit is
what is not opposed, not singled out, but universal. It is, indeed,
known, but what is, only is in knowledge, or it is no other Being than
that of the knowledge of consciousness. We see this development of
the universal in which real existence goes right over to the side of
consciousness, in the so much decried worldly wisdom of the Sophists;
we may view this as indicating that the negative nature of the
universal is now developing.
CHAPTER II
FIRST PERIOD, SECOND DIVISION: FROM THE SOPHISTS TO THE SOCRATICS.
IN this second division we have first to consider more particularly
the Sophists, secondly Socrates, and thirdly the Socratics, while we
distinguish from these Plato, and take him along with Aristotle in the
third division. The _νοῦς_, which is at first only grasped in a very
subjective manner as end, that is to say as that which is end to men,
_i.e._ the Good, in Plato and Aristotle became understood in what is on
the whole an objective way, as genus or Idea. Because thought has now
become set forth as principle, and this at first presents a subjective
appearance as being the subjective activity of thought, there now sets
in (since the absolute is posited as subject) an age of subjective
reflection; _i.e._ there begins in this period—which coincides with
the disintegration of Greece in the Peloponnesian war—the principle of
modern times.