Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume 1 (of 3) — Georg Hegel — John Shaqi
Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume 1 (of 3)
Georg Hegel · en
We elders, who in the storms of the age have ripened into men, may
think you happy whose youth falls in the day in which you may devote
the same undisturbed to Science and to Truth. I have dedicated my life
to Science, and it is a true joy to me to find myself again in this
place where I may, in a higher measure and more extensive circle,
work with others in the interests of the higher sciences, and help to
direct your way therein. I hope that I may succeed in deserving and
obtaining your confidence. But in the first place, I can ask nothing of
you but to bring with you, above all, a trust in science and a trust
in yourselves. The love of truth, faith in the power of mind, is the
first condition in Philosophy. Man, because he is Mind, should and must
deem himself worthy of the highest; he cannot think too highly of the
greatness and the power of his mind, and, with this belief, nothing
will be so difficult and hard that it will not reveal itself to him.
The Being of the universe, at first hidden and concealed, has no power
which can offer resistance to the search for knowledge; it has to lay
itself open before the seeker—to set before his eyes and give for his
enjoyment, its riches and its depths.
PREFATORY NOTE
IN the History of Philosophy the observation is immediately forced
upon us that it certainly presents great interest if its subject is
regarded from a favourable point of view, but that it would still
possess interest even if its end were regarded as opposite to what it
is. Indeed, this interest may seem to increase in the degree in which
the ordinary conception of Philosophy, and of the end which its history
serves, is reversed; for from the History of Philosophy a proof of the
futility of the science is mainly derived.
The demand that a history, whatever the subject may be, should state
the facts without prejudice and without any particular object or end
to be gained by its means, must be regarded as a fair one. But with a
commonplace demand like this, we do not get far; for the history of a
subject is necessarily intimately connected with the conception which
is formed of it. In accordance with this what is important in it is
determined, and the relation of the events to the end regulates the
selection of facts to be recorded, the mode of comprehending them, and
the point of view under which they are regarded. It may happen from the
ideas formed of what a State really is, that a reader of the political
history of a country may find therein nothing of what he looks for.
Still more may this be the case in the history of Philosophy, and
representations of this history may be instanced in which everything,
excepting what was supposed to be Philosophy, appears to be found.