Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume 2 (of 3)
Georg Hegel · en
For what is produced in accordance with
nature is always, or at least for the most part, produced” (external
universality as the constant recurrence of what has passed away), “but
this is not so with what happens through fortune or through chance.
That in which there is an end (τέλος), equally in its character as
something which precedes and as something which follows, is made into
end; as therefore a thing is made, so is its nature, and as is its
nature, so is it made; it exists therefore for the sake of this.” The
meaning of nature is that as something is, it was in the beginning;
it means this inward universality and adaptation to end that realizes
itself; and thus cause and effect are identical, since all individual
parts are related to this unity of end. “He who assumes contingent and
accidental forms, subverts, on the other hand, both nature itself and
that which subsists from nature, for that subsists from nature which
has a principle within itself, by whose means, and being continually
moved, it attains its end.” In this expression of Aristotle’s we now
find the whole of the true profound Notion of life, which must be
considered as an end in itself—a self-identity that independently
impels itself on, and in its manifestation remains identical with
its Notion: thus it is the self-effectuating Idea. Leaves, blossoms,
roots thus bring the plant into evidence and go back into it; and that
which they bring to pass is already present in the seed from which
they took their origin. The chemical product, on the contrary, does
not appear to have itself similarly present, for from acid and base a
third appears to come forth; but here, likewise, the essence of both
these sides, their relationship, is already present, though it is
there mere potentiality, as it is in the product merely a thing. But
the self-maintaining activity of life really brings forth this unity
in all relationships. What has here been said is already contained in
that which was asserted by those who do not represent nature in this
way, but say, “that which is constituted as though it were constituted
for an end, will endure.” For this is the self-productive action of
nature. In the modern way of looking at life this conception becomes
lost in two different ways; either through a mechanical philosophy,
in which we always find as principle pressure, impulse, chemical
relationships and forces, or external relations generally—which
certainly seem to be inherent in nature, but not to proceed from the
nature of the body, seeing that they are an added, foreign appendage,
such as colour in a fluid; or else theological physics maintain the
thoughts of an understanding outside of the world to be the causes.
In the Kantian philosophy we for the first time have that conception
once more awakened in us, for organic nature at least; life has there
been made an end to itself. In Kant this indeed had only the subjective
form which constitutes the essence of the Kantian philosophy, in which