Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume 2 (of 3) — Georg Hegel — John Shaqi
Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume 2 (of 3)
Georg Hegel · en
it seems as though life were only so determined by reason of our
subjective reasoning; but still the whole truth is there contained
that the organic creation is the self-maintaining. The fact that most
recent times have brought back the rational view of the matter into our
remembrance, is thus none else than a justification of the Aristotelian
Idea.
Aristotle also speaks of the end which is represented by organic nature
in itself, in relation to the means, of which he says (Phys. II. 8):
“If the swallow builds her nest, and the spider spreads her web, and
trees root themselves in the earth, for the sake of nutriment, there
is present in them a self-maintaining cause of this kind, or an end.”
For this instinctive action exhibits an operation of self-preservation,
as a means whereby natural existence becomes shut up and reflected
into itself. Aristotle then brings what is here said into relation
with general conceptions which he had earlier maintained (p. 138):
“Since nature is twofold as matter and form, but since the latter is
end, and the rest are on account of the end, this is final cause.”
For the active form has a content, which, as content of potentiality,
contains the means which make their appearance as adapted for an end,
_i.e._ as moments established through the determinate Notion. However
much we may, in the modern way of regarding things, struggle against
the idea of an immanent end, from reluctance to accept it, we must, in
the case of animals and plants, acknowledge such a conception, always
re-establishing itself in another. For example, because the animal
lives in water or in air, it is so constructed that it can maintain
its existence in air or water; thus it requires water to explain the
gills of fishes; and, on the other hand, because the animal is so
constructed, it lives in water. This activity in transformation thus
does not depend in a contingent way on life; it is aroused through the
outward powers, but only in as far as conformity with the soul of the
animal permits.