Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume 2 (of 3) — Georg Hegel — John Shaqi
Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume 2 (of 3)
Georg Hegel · en
that anything is the same excepting in name. The state is likewise
the essence of the individuals; the individual when separate from the
whole, is just as little complete in himself as any other organic part
separated from the whole.” This is directly antagonistic to the modern
principle in which the particular will of the individual, as absolute,
is made the starting-point; so that all men by giving their votes,
decide what is to be the law, and thereby a commonweal is brought into
existence. But with Aristotle, as with Plato, the state is the _prius_,
the substantial, the chief, for its end is the highest in respect
of the practical. “But whoever was incapable of this society, or so
complete in himself as not to want it, would be either a beast or a
god.”
From these few remarks it is clear that Aristotle could not have
had any thought of a so-called natural right (if a natural right be
wanted), that is, the idea of the abstract man outside of any actual
relation to others. For the rest, his Politics contain points of view
even now full of instruction for us, respecting the inward elements
of a state,[108] and a description of the various constitutions;[109]
the latter, however, has no longer the same interest, on account of
the different principle at the base of ancient and modern states. No
land was so rich as Greece, alike in the number of its constitutions,
and in the frequent changes from one to another of these in a single
state; but the Greeks were still unacquainted with the abstract right
of our modern states, that isolates the individual, allows of his
acting as such, and yet, as an invisible spirit, holds all its parts
together. This is done in such a way, however, that in no one is there
properly speaking either the consciousness of, or the activity for
the whole; but because the individual is really held to be a person,
and all his concern is the protection of his individuality, he works
for the whole without knowing how. It is a divided activity in which
each has only his part, just as in a factory no one makes a whole, but
only a part, and does not possess skill in other departments, because
only a few are employed in fitting the different parts together. It is
free nations alone that have the consciousness of and activity for the
whole; in modern times the individual is only free for himself as such,
and enjoys citizen freedom alone—in the sense of that of a _bourgeois_
and not of a _citoyen_. We do not possess two separate words to mark
this distinction. The freedom of citizens in this signification is
the dispensing with universality, the principle of isolation; but it
is a necessary moment unknown to ancient states. It is the perfect
independence of the points, and therefore the greater independence of
the whole, which constitutes the higher organic life. After the state
received this principle into itself, the higher freedom could come
forth. These other states are sports and products of nature which