Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume 2 (of 3) — Georg Hegel — John Shaqi
Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume 2 (of 3)
Georg Hegel · en
depend upon chance and upon the caprice of the individual, but now, for
the first time, the inward subsistence and indestructible universality,
which is real and consolidated in its parts, is rendered possible.
Aristotle for the rest has not tried like Plato to describe such a
state, but in respect of the constitution he merely points out that the
best must rule. But this always takes place, let men do as they will,
and hence he has not so very much to do with determining the forms of
the constitution. By way of proving that the best must rule, Aristotle
says this: “The best would suffer injustice if rated on an equality
with the others inferior to them in virtue and political abilities, for
a notable man is like a god amongst men.” Here Alexander is no doubt
in Aristotle’s mind, as one who must rule as though he were a god, and
over whom no one, and not even law, could maintain its supremacy. “For
him there is no law, for he himself is law. Such a man could perhaps
be turned out of the state, but not subjected to control any more than
Jupiter. Nothing remains but, what is natural to all, quietly to submit
to such an one, and to let men like this be absolutely and perpetually
(ἀΐδιοι) kings in the states”[110] The Greek Democracy had then
entirely fallen into decay, so that Aristotle could no longer ascribe
to it any merit.
4. THE LOGIC.
On the other side of the Philosophy of Mind, we have still Aristotle’s
science of abstract thought, a Logic, to consider. For hundreds and
thousands of years it was just as much honoured as it is despised now.
Aristotle has been regarded as the originator of Logic: his logical
works are the source of, and authority for the logical treatises of all
times; which last were, in great measure, only special developments
or deductions, and must have been dull, insipid, imperfect, and purely
formal. And even in quite recent times, Kant has said that since the
age of Aristotle, logic—like pure geometry since Euclid’s day—has
been a complete and perfect science which has kept its place even
down to the present day, without attaining to any further scientific
improvements or alteration. Although logic is here mentioned for the
first time, and in the whole of the history of Philosophy that is to
come no other can be mentioned (for no other has existed, unless we
count the negation of Scepticism), we cannot here speak more precisely
of its content, but merely find room for its general characterization.
The forms he gives to us come from Aristotle both in reference to the
Notion and to the judgment and conclusion. As in natural history,
animals, such as the unicorn, mammoth, beetle, mollusc, &c., are
considered, and their nature described, so Aristotle is, so to speak,
the describer of the nature of these spiritual forms of thought; but in
this inference of the one from the other, Aristotle has only presented
thought as defined in its finite application and aspect, and his logic