Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume 2 (of 3)
Georg Hegel · en
Further, a second point with Epicurus is the contemplation of death,
the negative of existence, of self-consciousness in man; he requires
us to have a true conception of death, because otherwise it disturbs
our tranquillity. He accordingly says: “Accustom thyself then to the
thought that death concerns us not; for all good and evil is a matter
of sensation, but death is a deprivation (στέρησις) of sensation.
Therefore the true reflection that death is no concern of ours,
makes our mortal life one of enjoyment, since this thought does not
add an endless length of days, but does away with the longing after
immortality. For nothing in life has terrors for him who has once truly
recognized the fact that not to live is not a matter of dread. Thus it
is a vain thing to fear death, not because its presence but because
the anticipation of it brings us pain. For how can the anticipation
of a thing pain us when its reality does not? There is therefore in
death nothing to trouble us. For when we are in life, death is not
there, and when death is there, we are not. Therefore death does not
concern either the living or the dead.” This is quite correct, if we
look at the immediate; it is a thought full of meaning, and drives away
fear. Mere privation, which death is, is not to be confounded with the
feeling of being alive, which is positive; and there is no reason for
worrying oneself about it. “But the future in general is neither ours,
nor is it not ours; hence we must not count upon it as something that
will come to pass, nor yet despair of it, as if it would not come to
pass.”[166] It is no concern of ours either that it is or that it is
not; and it need not therefore cause us uneasiness. This the right way
in which to regard the future also.