Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume 3 (of 3) — Georg Hegel — John Shaqi
Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume 3 (of 3)
Georg Hegel · en
In Christianity these absolute claims of the intellectual world and of
spirit had become the universal consciousness. Christianity proceeded
from Judaism, from self-conscious abjectness and depression. This feeling
of nothingness has from the beginning characterized the Jews; a sense of
desolation, an abjectness where no reason was, has possession of their
life and consciousness. This single point has later on, and in its proper
time, become a matter of universal history, and into this element of the
nullity of actuality the whole world has raised itself, passing out of
this principle indeed, but also into the kingdom of Thought, because that
nothingness has transformed itself into what is positively reconciled.
This is a second creation which came to pass after the first; in it Mind
became aware of itself as I = I, that is, as self-consciousness. This
second creation has first of all appeared in self-consciousness equally
directly in the form of a sensuous world, in the form of a sensuous
consciousness. As much of the Notion as has entered in was adopted by the
Fathers from the philosophers already mentioned; their Trinity, in so far
as a rational thought, and not a mere ordinary conception, comes from
these, and certain other ideas also. But what mainly distinguishes them
is the fact that for the Christian this intelligible world had likewise
this immediate sensuous truth of an ordinary course of events—a form
which it must have and retain for the majority of men.
3. This new world has therefore, however, to be adopted by a new race of
men, by Barbarians; for it is characteristic of barbarians to apprehend
the spiritual in a sensuous way. And it must be by northern barbarians,
for it is the northern self-containedness alone that is the immediate
principle of this new world-consciousness. With this self-consciousness
of the intelligible world as a world immediately actual, mind, having
regard to what it has in itself become, is higher than before, but, on
the other side, in respect of its consciousness it is thrown quite back
to the beginning of culture, and this consciousness had to commence
from the beginning again. What it had to overcome was on the one hand
this sensuous immediacy of its intelligible world, and secondly the
opposed sensuous immediacy of actuality, by its consciousness held as
null. It excludes the sun, replaces it with tapers, is furnished with
images merely; it is in itself alone, and inward, not reconciled for
consciousness—to self-consciousness a sinful, wicked world is present.
For the intelligible world of Philosophy had not yet completed in
itself the task of making itself the actual world—of recognizing the
intelligible in the actual, as well as the actual in the intelligible.
It is one thing to have the Idea of Philosophy, to recognize absolute
essence as absolute essence, and quite another thing to recognize
it as the system of the universe, of nature, and of individual