Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume 3 (of 3) — Georg Hegel — John Shaqi
Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume 3 (of 3)
Georg Hegel · en
From Christianity, within whose bounds we now have our place, Philosophy
has to re-establish its position. In heathendom the root of knowledge
was external nature as thought devoid of self, and subjective nature
as the inward self. Both Nature and the natural self of mankind, and
likewise thought, there possessed affirmative significance; hence all
this was good. In Christianity the root of truth has, however, quite
another meaning; it was not only the truth as against the heathen gods,
but as against Philosophy also, against nature, against the immediate
consciousness of man. Nature is there no longer good, but merely a
negative; self-consciousness, the thought of man, his pure self, all this
receives a negative position in Christianity. Nature has no validity,
and affords no interest; its universal laws, as the reality under which
the individual existences of nature are collected, have likewise no
authority: the heavens, the sun, the whole of nature is a corpse. Nature
is given over to the spiritual, and indeed to spiritual subjectivity;
thus the course of nature is everywhere broken in upon by miracles. With
this surrender of natural necessity we have the fact associated that all
further content, all that truth which constitutes the universal of that
nature, is given and revealed. The one starting-point, the contemplation
of nature, is thus for knowledge undoubtedly not present. Then this fact
is likewise set aside that I am present as a self. The self as this
immediate certainty has to be abrogated; it must also merge itself in
another self, but in one beyond, and only there does it have its value.
This other self, in which the proper self is made to have its freedom,
is first of all likewise a particular self, that has not the form of
universality: it is determined and limited in time and space, and at
the same time has the significance of an absolute in and for itself. A
real sense of self is thus abandoned, but what self-consciousness on the
other hand gains is not a universal, a thought. In thought I have real
affirmative significance, not as an individual, but as universal ‘I’; the
content of truth is now, however, plainly individualized, and thus the
thought of the ‘I’ falls away. Thereby, however, the highest concrete
content of the absolute Idea is set forth, in which the opposites that
are plainly infinite are united; it is the power which unites in itself
what appears to consciousness infinitely removed from one another—the
mortal and the absolute. This absolute is itself ‘this’ first of all as
this concrete, not as abstraction, but as the unity of universal and
individual; this concrete consciousness is for the first time truth. The
reason of the former content being also true, comes to me as something
not pertaining to myself, but as a thing received outside of self.
The testimony of spirit, indeed, pertains thereto, and my inmost self
is present there; but the testimony of spirit is a thing concealed,