Hegel's Philosophy of Mind — Georg Hegel — John Shaqi
Hegel's Philosophy of Mind
Georg Hegel · en
The State—which in its actuality must always be a quasi-national state—is
thus the supreme unity of Nature and Mind. Its natural basis in land,
language, blood, and the many ties which spring therefrom, has to be
constantly raised into an intelligent unity through universal interests.
But the elements of race and of culture have no essential connexion, and
they perpetually incline to wrench themselves asunder. Blood and judgment
are for ever at war in the state as in the individual(10): the
cosmopolitan interest, to which the maxim is _Ubi bene, ibi patria_,
resists the national, which adopts the patriotic watchword of Hector(11).
The State however has another source of danger in the very principle that
gave it birth. It arose through antagonism: it was baptised on the
battlefield, and it only lives as it is able to assert itself against a
foreign foe. And this circumstance tends to intensify and even pervert its
natural basis of nationality:—tends to give the very conception of the
political a negative and superficial look. But, notwithstanding all these
drawbacks, the State in its Idea is entitled to the name Hobbes gave
it,—the Mortal God. Here in a way culminates the obviously objective,—we
may almost say, visible and tangible—development of Man and Mind. Here it
attains a certain completeness—a union of reality and of ideality: a
quasi-immortality, a quasi-universality. What the individual person could
not do unaided, he can do in the strength of his commonwealth. Much that
in the solitary was but implicit or potential, is in the State actualised.
But the God of the State is a mortal God. It is but a national and a
limited mind. To be actual, one must at least begin by restricting
oneself. Or, rather actuality is rational, but always with a conditioned
and a relative rationality(12): it is in the realm of action and
re-action,—in the realm of change and nature. It has warring forces
outside it,—warring forces inside it. Its unity is never perfect: because
it never produces a true identity of interests within, or maintains an
absolute independence without. Thus the true and real State—the State in
its Idea—the realisation of concrete humanity,—of Mind as the fullness and
unity of nature—is not reached in any single or historical State: but
floats away, when we try to seize it, into the endless progress of
history. Always indeed the State, the historical and objective, points
beyond itself. It does so first in the succession of times. _Die
Weltgeschichte ist das Weltgericht._(13) And in that doom of the world the
eternal blast sweeps along the successive generations of the temporal, one
expelling another from the stage of time—each because it is inadequate to
the Idea which it tried to express, and has succumbed to an enemy from
without because it was not a real and true unity within.