Prolegomena to the Study of Hegel's Philosophy, and Especially of His Logic
Georg Hegel · en
There is, however, a difference between the way in which these
results look to us now, and the way in which they originally
organised themselves. The child who begins to learn a language in the
lesson-books and the grammars finds the members of it all, as it were,
upon one level: adjectives, adverbs, prepositions, and verbs confront
him with the same authority and rank. This appearance is deceptive:
it may easily suggest that the words are not members in an organism,
in and out of which they have developed. And this organism of thought
has its individual types, expressed in the great families of human
speech. Its generic form (as drawn out in a logical system) appears
in different grades, with different degrees of fullness, in Altaic
and Dravidian from what it does in Malay, or in Chinese, and these
again have their own predominant categories as compared with those
used in the American or African languages, or in Indo-Germanic and
Semitic. If the Altaic languages e. g. are wanting in the verb proper,
and manage with possessive suffixes and nouns; if the Semitic tenses
display a poverty which contrasts with their wealth in Greek; and
yet each group performs its function, we may infer that each speech
has a complete organism, though it does not bring all its parts to
adequate expression. All this distinction of 'parts of speech,' of
forms, prefixes and suffixes, &c., is part of the life of language,
embodying in more or less distinct organs the organisation of thought
in the individual form it reached in that speech-type. Thus in Chinese
there are strictly speaking no isolated words, nouns, or verbs: there
are only abstract parts of a concrete sentence; and grammar in Chinese
therefore has no accidence (no declensions, conjugations, &c.) but
only syntax. Yet it is these abstract fragments which exist and seem
to have independence and inherent meaning: whereas the unity in which
they cohere to form a concrete context is the fleeting sentence of
the moment. At the opposite extreme, again, the Mexican family of
languages tend to incorporate relations to subject and object with
the verb, in such a degree that the word almost becomes a sentence.
Facts like these suggest that a science of the forms of language, in
proportion as it generalises, tends to approach logic; and that logic
will have a converse tendency to elevate to an unduly typical position
the grammatical form of the languages with which the logician is best
acquainted.