Prolegomena to the Study of Hegel's Philosophy, and Especially of His Logic
Georg Hegel · en
Like a _deus ex machina_, or a trick of the trade, it is applied to
unloose every knot, and to clear any difficulties that arise. But a
principle of this stamp possesses no intimate connexion or organic
solidarity with the theory which it helps to prop. It is always at
hand as a ready-made schema or heading, and can be attached to the
most incongruous orders of fact. Thus in the works of Aristotle, the
principle of 'End' or 'Activity' has sometimes seemed to be applied
to whatever subject comes forward, and like a hereditary official
vestment to suit all its wearers equally well or equally ill. What is
true 'on the whole' is not always true 'of each': the _καθόλον_ never
quite equals the _καθ' ἔκαστον._ The modern principle of Utility is
equally flexible in its application to the problems of moral and social
life. It costs no trouble to pronounce the magic word, and even 'such
as are of weaker capacity' may make something out of such a formula.
But an abstract formula, which is equally applicable to everything,
is not particularly applicable to anything. While it seems to save
trouble, and is so plain as to be almost tautological (as when the
worth of a thing or act is explained to mean its utility), it really
suggests fresh questions in every case, and multiplies the difficulty.
Having an outward adaptability to every kind of fact, the principle
has no true sympathy with any: it becomes a mere form, which we use as
we do a measuring-rod, moving it along from one thing to another. We
are always reverting to first principles as our last principles also.
Even Aristotle, when he remarked that an object had to be criticised
from its own principles and not from general formulae, saw through the
fallacy of this style of argument.
This is like asking for bread and getting a stone. The philosopher,
who ought to take us through the shut chambers of the world, merely
hands us a key at the gate, telling us that it will unlock every door,
and then the insides will speak for themselves. But we would have our
philosopher do a little more than this. Not being ourselves omniscient,
we should be glad of a guide-book at the least, and perhaps even of
the services of an interpreter to explain some peculiarities, some
startling phenomena, and sights even more unpleasant than those which
appalled the spouse of the notorious Bluebeard. Or, dropping metaphor,
we wish the formula to be applied systematically and thoroughly.
When that is done the formula loses its abstractness; it gains those
necessary amplifications and qualifications, as we call them, without
which no theory explains much or gives much information. And thus,
instead of fancying that our initial formula contains the truth in a
nutshell, we shall find that it is only one step to be taken on the
way to truth, and that its narrow statement sinks more and more into
insignificance, as its amplified theory gains in significance.