But an adequate principle must have other qualities.[3] What has been said up to this point, only amounts to a condition, that our principle must cease to be abstract and formal, and must become concrete and real. What we want, it may be said, is a Beginning. But a beginning is not exactly the same thing as a principle: a beginning is to a large extent a matter of choice and convenience,--a matter depending on the state and prospects of the beginner; and the main point is not where we should begin, but that we should be thorough in our treatment. It is otherwise, however, in the present case. For the skill of the expositor simply lies in the exactitude with which he reproduces the spontaneous movement of growth in his object. His art is _celare artem:_ to retire, as it were, into the background, and seem to leave the object to expound itself. In a dramatic work it is no doubt the hand of the dramatist that seems to set the whole of the characters in motion, that weaves destinies and snips the thread of life. And yet in a perfect work of dramatic art everything must seem to flow on by a necessity of character, a consecution of inner fate. The true artist dare not act or allow the _deus ex machina._ So every genuine work of science--which is more than a compilation, a school-book, a bundle of notes, and contributions toward a subject--must be a self-determined unity--a self-justifying scheme in which the personality of the worker enters into and is absorbed in the system of his work. If this is generally true, it is above all a canon to rule the logician. He at least must follow the Logos and the Logos alone. His theme must be a law unto itself: all its movements must be freely and nobly objective. For his subject-matter is at least an organism, and develops according to an inward law. But it is even more than an organism: it must not merely develop, as organisms do,--not merely live and grow--but _know_ that it develops and as it were _will_ its own development--and in that harmony of being, willing, and knowing, be essentially one. In Hegelian language it must not merely be implicit_--an sich_ or _für uns_--the subject of a change which it undergoes and feels, but without definitely realising,--the subject of a change which we (the historians) perceive. It must also be _für sich_: aware of its modifications, an agent in bringing them about: and yet withal in so looking forth and willing, be self-possessed, and self-enjoying.