Prolegomena to the Study of Hegel's Philosophy, and Especially of His Logic
Georg Hegel · en
This, then, is the price to be paid for rising into reality, and coming
to be somewhat: there is always somewhat else to be minded. The very
point which makes a 'somewhat,' as above a mere 'nothing,' is its
determinateness: and determinateness, as at first determinateness from
outside, a given and passive determinateness, is also a negation and
limit. Now the limit of a thing is that point where it begins to be
somewhat else: where it passes out of itself and yields to another.
Accordingly in the very act of being determined, somewhat is passing
over into another: it is altering, and becoming somewhat else. Thus a
some-thing' implies for its being the being of somewhat else: its being
is as it were only to be beside something else,--it is finite, and
alterable, a _this_ with a _that_ always in the neighbourhood. Such is
the character of determinate being. It leads to an endless series from
some to an other, and so on _ad infinitum:_ everything as a somewhat,
as a determinate being, in reality, presupposes a something else, and
that again has some third thing; and so the chain is extended with
its everlasting _And,_ And, And, (as in the children's way of telling
a story). Somewhat-ness is always vexed by the fact that it is not
somewhat else: and for that very reason, ceasing to be the primary
object, it becomes somewhat else itself; and the other term becomes the
somewhat. And so the same story is repeated in endless progression,
till one gets wearied with the repetition of finitude which is held out
as infinite.