Prolegomena to the Study of Hegel's Philosophy, and Especially of His Logic
Georg Hegel · en
Thus in determinate being as in mere being we see the apparent fixity
resolved into a double movement--the alteration from some to somewhat
else, and _vice versa._ But a movement like this implies after all
that there is a something which alters: which is alterable, but which
alters into somewhat. This somewhat which alters into somewhat, and
thus retains itself, is a being which has risen above alteration, which
is independent of it because including it: which is _for itself,_ and
not for somewhat else. Thus in order to advance a step further from
determinate and alterable being, we have only to keep a firm grasp
on both sides of the process, and not suffer the one to slip away
from the other. We must not merely _say,_ but energise the unity of
the two 'antithetical yet inseparable' elements we are naturally
disposed to take and leave only as One _and_ an Other. Something
becomes something else: in short, the one side passes on to the other
side of the antithesis, and the limitation is absorbed. The new result
is something _in_ something else: the limit is taken up within: and
this being which results is its own limit, i. e. no restrictive limit
at all, but self-imposed characteristic and definiteness. It is
Being-for-self:--the third step in the process of thought under the
general category of Being. The range of Being which began in a vague
nebula, and passed into a series of points, is now reduced to a single
point, self-complete and whole.
This Being-for-self is a kind of true infinite, which results by
absorption of the finite. The false infinite, which has already come
before us, is the endless range of finitude, passing from one finite
to another, from somewhat to somewhat else, until _satiety_ sets in
with weariness. The true infinite is _satisfaction_,--the inclusion
of the other being into self, so that it is no longer a limit, but a
constituent part in the being. Such inclusion in the unity of an idea,
of elements which are realistically separate, is termed 'ideality.' The
antithesis is reduced to become an organic and dependent part. It still
exists, but as no longer outside and independent. Thus in determinate
being the determinateness is found in somewhat else: in being-for-self
the determinateness is self-realisation. Being-for-self may be shortly
expressed by 'one' or 'each': as determinate being a, or an, or by
'some': and Being simple has no nominal equivalent. As 'some' is always
fractional or partial, 'each' is always a whole or unit. Mere Being has
not the consistency of any noun or pronoun: it is the bare (impersonal)
verb.