Prolegomena to the Study of Hegel's Philosophy, and Especially of His Logic — Georg Hegel — John Shaqi
Prolegomena to the Study of Hegel's Philosophy, and Especially of His Logic
Georg Hegel · en
This change from Measure to Essential Being is one which Greek
philosophy seems to exhibit in the step from Pythagoreanism to
Platonism. Plato himself has noted the passage from what have been
called the mathematical to the metaphysical categories, and insisted
on the essential and higher truth to which mathematics only point.
Mathematical terms give the supreme definiteness to the world of being;
they show it as in its several compartments a world immanently ordered
and measured. As in Greek Art, all seems to be fully brought to the
surface: as the image suggests no further and deeper meaning, but
affords an absolute identity of aspect and purport; so the natural and
semi-popular philosophy of Greece was satisfied for its ethics with the
proportionate, the becoming, the beautiful. Plato however passes beyond
the surface, and reflects the apparent fact on a deeper permanent
reality behind. That reality is still, in name, only the 'form' or
'shape'-- only the regular and permanent type--only the measure. But
it is called the really real, the _ὄντως ὄν_,--the being of being. In
it the truth is clear, transparent, one and systematic, which in the
sensible or immediate world is obscure, confused, multiple. It is the
key to explain the difficulties and irregularities of the first and
visible scene. Yet even Plato never for a moment forgets the essential
correspondence of the two realms, however he may insist upon their
separation, and however hard he may find it to explain how being can be
duplicated, how the one can be many and yet not cease to be one, how
appearance has part in reality.
This indeed is not a difficulty confined to Plato. It is, after all,
the same antithesis as we found in the beginning: the Is which lapses
into the Is not. It now becomes the play of positive and negative--of
perpetual relativity: of a known dependent on an unknown, and an
unknown interpreted by a known: an essence guaranteed by its show
or seeming and a _Schein_ which supposes permanent _Sein._ How can a
thing be, and yet not be true? How can pleasures seem and not be real?
Aristotle, taking up the Platonic antithesis of true and apparent
being, carries it on into greater detail. Matter and form: possibility
and actuality: are amongst his cardinal pairs of correlatives. But
he is anxious to maintain their essential relativity: to show that
reality only is and maintains itself as the unity of the two poles of
universal and particular, reason and sense, or as a syllogism and a
development. So far as he succeeds in doing this, Aristotle rises above
the correlational view of reality into the comprehension of it as a
unity, which carries itself through difference into self-realisation.
[Footnote 1: What he did show was that these Ideas were not objects in
the vulgar sense of reality, or things.]
[Footnote 2: Cf. the controversy between Schiller and Goethe as to idea
and observation, quoted by Whewell, _Scientific Ideas_, i. 36.]