The Introduction to Hegel's Philosophy of Fine Arts: Translated from the German with Notes and Prefatory Essay — Georg Hegel — John Shaqi
The Introduction to Hegel's Philosophy of Fine Arts: Translated from the German with Notes and Prefatory Essay
Georg Hegel · en
nevertheless contains some truth, although stated in abstract shape.
Then follows the further question--what Meyer opposes to Hirt's
artistic principle, _i.e._ what he himself prefers. He is treating, in
the first place, exclusively of the principle shown in the artistic
works of the ancients, which principle, however, must include the
essential attribute[40] of beauty. In dealing with this subject he is
led to speak of Mengs and Winckelmann's principle[40] of the Ideal, and
pronounces himself to the effect that he desires neither to reject nor
wholly to accept this law of beauty, but, on the other hand, has no
hesitation in attaching himself to the opinion of an enlightened judge
of art (Goethe), as it is definite,[41] and seems to solve the enigma
more precisely.
Goethe says: "The highest principle of the ancients was the
_significant_, but the highest result of successful _treatment_, the
_beautiful_."
If we look closer at what this opinion implies, we find in it again two
elements; the content or matter in hand, and the mode and fashion of
representation. In looking at a work of art we begin with what presents
itself immediately to us, and after that go on to consider what is its
significance or content.
The former, the external element, has no value for us simply as it
stands; we assume something further behind it, something inward, a
significance, by which the external semblance has a soul breathed into
it.[42] It is this, its soul, that the external appearance indicates.
For an appearance which means something, does not present to the mind's
eye itself and that which it is _qua_ external, but something else; as
does the _symbol_ for instance, and still more obviously the _fable_,
whose moral and precept constitutes its meaning. Indeed every _word_
points to a meaning and has no value in itself. Just so the human
eye, a man's face, flesh, skin, his whole figure, are a revelation of
mind and soul, and in this case the meaning is always something other
than what shows itself within the immediate appearance. This is the
way in which a work of art should have its meaning, and not appear as
exhausted in these mere particular lines, curves, surfaces, borings,
reliefs in the stone, in these colours, tones, sounds, of words, or
whatever other medium is employed; but it should reveal life, feeling,
soul, import and mind, which is just what we mean by the significance
of a work of art.
Thus this requirement of _significance_ in a work of art amounts to
hardly anything beyond or different from Hirt's principle of the
_characteristic_.
According to this notion, then, we find distinguished as the elements
of the beautiful something inward, a content, and something outer which
has that content as its significance; the inner shows itself in the
outer and gives itself to be known by its means, inasmuch as the outer
points away from itself to the inner.
We cannot go into detail on this head.