The Introduction to Hegel's Philosophy of Fine Arts: Translated from the German with Notes and Prefatory Essay
Georg Hegel · en
But the purpose of instruction may be treated as _purpose_, to such a
degree that the universal nature of the represented content is doomed
to be exhibited and expounded directly and obviously as abstract
proposition, prosaic reflection, or general theorem, and not merely
in an indirect way in the concrete form of a work of art. By such a
severance the sensuous plastic form, which is just what makes the
work of art a work of _art_, becomes a mere otiose accessory, a husk
which is expressly pronounced to be mere husk, a semblance expressly
pronounced to be mere semblance. But thereby the very nature of the
work of art is distorted. For the work of art ought to bring a content
before the mind's eye, not in its generality as such, but with this
generality made absolutely individual, and sensuously particularized.
If the work of art does not proceed from this principle, but sets in
relief its generalized aspect with the purpose of abstract instruction,
then the imaginative and sensuous aspect is only an external and
superfluous adornment, and the work of art is a thing divided against
itself,[89] in which form and content no longer appear as grown into
one. In that case the sensuously individual and the spiritually
general are become external to one another.
And further, if the purpose of art is limited to this _didactic_
utility, then its other aspect, that of pleasure, entertainment, and
delight, is pronounced to be in itself _unessential_, and ought to have
its substance merely in the utility of the teaching on which it is
attendant. But this amounts to pronouncing that art does not bear its
vocation and purpose in itself, but that its conception is rooted in
something else, to which it is a _means_. Art is, in this case, only
one among the several means which prove useful and are applied for
the purpose of instruction. This brings us to the boundary at which
art is made no longer to be an end on its own merits, seeing that
it is degraded into a mere toy of entertainment or a mere means of
instruction.
([Greek: gg]) This boundary becomes most sharply marked when a question
is raised, in its turn, about a supreme end and aim for the sake of
which the passions are to be purified and men are to be instructed.
This aim has often, in modern times, been declared to be _moral_
improvement, and the aim of art has been placed in the function of
preparing the inclinations and impulses for moral perfection, and
of leading them to this goal. This idea combines purification with
instruction, inasmuch as art is, by communicating an insight into
genuine moral goodness--that is, by instruction,--at the same time
to incite to purification, and in this way alone to bring about the
improvement of mankind as its useful purpose and supreme goal.