The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 1 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik — Georg Hegel — John Shaqi
The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 1 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik
Georg Hegel · en
[Footnote 61: A difficult sentence to translate. I have followed
Professor Bosanquet in assuming that the substantive with which
_mangelhaft_ agrees must be borrowed from the following sentence,
though it seems also to be carried on in a loose kind of way from the
previous sentence (_Gesckmacksinn._) The entire sentence is built,
as we have it, on the further confusion that there are two parallels
which before the sentence ends are regarded as one! That is to say, the
general critical sense is contrasted with the critique of particular
works of art and further the defect of that general sense in its
neglect of _universal_ principles is further contrasted with the way
the specific critique deals with _particular_ works. I hardly think,
however, that my admirable predecessor is justified in ignoring the
comparative degree of _bestimmteres_, or in his translation of _Zeug_
as "power." I take it to mean the material of actual works of art.
The sentence is a good example of, some of the difficulties of Hegel
translation.]
[Footnote 62: _Die Sache._ The subject-matter in its most real sense as
"content."]
[Footnote 63: That is, the so-called "good taste."]
[Footnote 64: _Begriff._ Concrete notional Idea.]
[Footnote 65: That is, in his physical form.]
[Footnote 66: Hegel is here considering desire abstractedly, that
is, on its own account (_als solche._) It may of course in its turn
subserve a rational purpose, such as the preservation of health or
life. But the contrast here is between the relation of appetite, and
that of the theoretic faculty to objects.]
[Footnote 67: _Sein Objekt._ The object in which he finds himself;
rather this, I think, than that which he has created.]
[Footnote 68: _Innerlich_, _i.e._, in the world of mind as contrasted
with that of the sensuous _vorhandene._]
[Footnote 69: Hegel or his editors have "in a converse way." This is
obviously a mistake. In both examples the point is that the object
is _preserved_ as against _desire_ with its destruction, and the
_contemplative intelligence_ with its ideal transformation.]