The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 1 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik
Georg Hegel · en
THE NOTION OF THE BEAUTIFUL IN ITS GENERAL SIGNIFICANCE
I
We have defined beauty to be the Idea of the beautiful.
By this definition is implied that we have to conceive the beautiful
as Idea, and, moreover, as Idea in a determinate shape, as _Ideal._
Idea, as thus posited, is just this, the conceptive notion, the
realization of the same, and the unity of both. The notion, as such, is
not yet the Idea, although the terms notion and idea are often loosely
interchanged. Idea is the notion only as presented in, and brought
into coalescence with, its objective reality. This unity, however, is
by no means to be regarded as the mere _neutralization_ of notion and
reality, so that the individual character and quality of either is
absorbed; as, for example, where we find that in a chemical compound
salt-potash and acid tend to neutralize each other in so far as they
have weakened their opposition. In this unity, on the contrary, the
notion is retained as the commanding factor. It is already implicitly,
in virtue of its own nature, this very identity. Out of its own wealth
it evolves the reality as part of itself, by means of a process which,
being no other than that of development, surrenders nothing of its
own nature, but brings into more concrete actuality the riches of the
notion, and for this reason continues in unity with itself and its
objective realization. Such a unity of the notional concept and its
realization is the Idea defined in abstract terms. The word idea is,
of course, frequently used by authors of works dealing with the theory
of art. It must, however, be admitted that many connoisseurs of high
standing are particularly severe upon its employment. The latest and
most interesting example of this polemical attitude is to be found
in Herr von Rumohr's "Italian investigations." This work is based on
the practical interest that the arts excite, and is wholly unconcerned
with that which for brevity we may call the Idea. The truth is that
this writer, who appears to have no knowledge of the development of
philosophy in modern times, freely confuses the expression as above
defined with the undetermined conceptions of the phantasy, or the
abstract and characterless Ideal of well-known art theories or schools
of art, ideas which present a lean contrast to the clearly defined and
richly caparisoned objects of Nature in their truth, and which this
writer opposes to the idea and empty Ideal, which the artist himself
evolves from his own consciousness. We have, of course, no more right
to suppose that creative work can be the result of such poverty, than
we can with justice assume that a thinker can think with conceptions
wholly indeterminate, and persist in his thought with a content
destitute of all defined relation. Such an objection, however, does not
apply in any respect to the Idea in the sense we use the expression.
This Idea is through and through concrete; a whole which consists of