The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 1 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik
Georg Hegel · en
relations and is simply beautiful from being in direct union with the
objective form adequate to its expression.
Herr von Rumohr has placed on record in this very book (Book I, pp.
145-46) the following assertion, that "beauty in the most comprehensive
meaning of the term, and as it is understood by intelligent people of
our day, includes every quality of an object, which may either stir the
sense of sight with satisfaction, or through that sense attune the soul
and delight the mind."
These qualities are then further subdivided into three classes
as follows: "First, there is all that is perceptible through the
eye; secondly, that which is apprehended by means of the peculiar,
presumably innate sense of mankind for spatial relations; and thirdly,
all that in the first instance works upon the understanding, and
only indirectly through cognition on the emotions." This third and
most important determination rests apparently on forms "which quite
independently of all pleasure to the sense and the beauty of extended
shape arouse in us a specific delight which is ethical or spiritual
in its quality, which in part to all appearance proceeds from the
enjoyment we derive from the images excited (I presume he means ethical
or spiritual ones)[188], and in part from the pleasure which the mere
activity of an intelligent appreciation infallibly brings with it."
Such are the principal factors according to which this undoubted
connoisseur of art defines his subject relatively to the beautiful. It
may very possibly pass muster with a certain type of uncritical reader.
It is, however, very unsatisfactory regarded from the philosophical
standpoint. For what does it at bottom amount to but this, namely, that
the sense of vision or spiritual sense, we may add the understanding
itself, are moved pleasurably, or excite a feeling which results in
awakened pleasure. The entire argument hinges on this one aspect of
awakened gratification. This reduction, however, of the activity of the
beautiful to terms of feeling--that which pleases and charms us--has
been disposed of once for all by Kant. His exposition has already left
far behind the feeling for the beautiful.
We will direct our attention now from this polemical tractate to a
further consideration of the Idea its hostility has failed to weaken.
In this, as already stated, is comprehended the concrete _unity_ of the
_notion_ and its objective realization.