The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 1 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik — Georg Hegel — John Shaqi
The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 1 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik
Georg Hegel · en
Such, then, are the activities, in which the notion of animated life
makes itself apparent. Moreover, the principle of Ideality thus
rendered visible is not merely the result of _our_ reflection; it
is _objectively_ real itself in the living subject, whose existence
consequently we may go so far as to call an objective idealism. And
it is the soul, as before stated, which, as this ideal energy, brings
about its own manifestation[223], always reducing the _purely_ external
reality of the body to an appearance, and thereby affirming itself as
objective totality in that very bodily shape.
2. Now it is as the Idea made objectively visible to the senses that
the animated life of Nature is _beautiful_; in so far, that is to
say, as the truth or the Idea, presented in the form of Nature, where
under it first appears, in other words life, is immediately given in
the particular shape of reality adequate to it. Owing, however, to its
sensuous immediacy the living beauty of Nature is neither beautiful
_for itself_ nor is the beauty strictly that which is _the outcome_ of
itself, a product, that is, of its purely objective appearance. The
beauty of Nature is only beautiful for another, that is _for us_, the
consciousness that apprehends its beauty. The question therefore arises
in what way and by virtue of what characteristics the principle of life
appears to us beautiful in its _immediate_ existence.
(_a_) If we look at the practical way in which a living object
becomes visible and preserves itself, the first thing which rivets
our attention is _spontaneous motion._ This motion, regarded simply
as motion, is nothing more than the entirely abstract freedom of
motion from place to place and from time to time, which we find
exemplified in the spontaneous, but entirely haphazard movements of
animal life. In music and the dance we have, it is true, motion in
its generic significance; but here motion is not merely a matter of
chance and impulse, but it exhibits the laws which regulate it; it
is defined, complete in itself and subject to measure; and it is all
this, though we still abstract from it the significance whereof it is
the beautiful expression. If we again interpret the motion of animals
as the realization of an aim originating within themselves, this
excited impulse is still entirely accidental, an end of most restricted
import. If we further extend our survey and conceive such motion as
the activity and working together of all parts of the animal organism
towards a definite purpose, we shall merely find that such a conception
is rendered possible by our own effort of imagination[224]. The case is
just the same if we reflect upon the way in which an animal gratifies
its physical wants, obtains nourishment through the organs which
grasp it, consume it, digest it, and generally is a subject of the
process which preserves its life. For in this case also we have either
only before us single desires and their spontaneous and haphazard