The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 1 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik
Georg Hegel · en
gratification, in which the inward activity[225] of the organism is not
present at all, or at least all these activities and their means of
expression have become the subject of our imaginative reflection, which
is at pains to understand such a process by relating it to definite
ends, and to establish a harmony between aims assumed to belong to the
animal itself and the organs which fulfill them.
We shall rather find that neither the sensuous perception of single
haphazard appetites, arbitrary movements and efforts towards
self-satisfaction, nor the fanciful consideration of the animal
organism as one directed by purpose will present to us purely animal
life as a part of the beauty of Nature. The beauty consists in the
appearance of individual form, both in repose and motion, quite apart
from the relation of its self-gratification to any purpose thus
subserved, as it is apart from the entirely isolated contingency of
self-imposed movement[226]. Such beauty is related to the _form_ alone,
because it is only as such that it is the external appearance, in which
the objective idealism of the principle of life makes itself known
to us as a thing perceived and contemplated upon through the senses.
Thought apprehends this "objective idealism" in the medium of its
notion, appropriating the same in the element of _universality_ which
belongs to it, albeit the contemplation of its beauty is inseparably
bound with its _phenomenal reality._ And this reality is the external
form of the articulated organism, which is, in our view of it, quite
as much determinate particularity as it is a semblance, namely, that
of the physical manifold of the separate members, which can only form
part of the concrete totality of the _living form_ under the guise of
phenomenal appearance.
(_b_) From the explanation of the notion of life already given we
may deduce more narrowly the form of this appearance as follows. The
form is one of spatial extension, limitation, and configuration,
distinguished through its various shape, colour, and motion, being, in
fact, a manifold of such distinctions. If, however, the organism which
manifests these differences is a living organism, it will inevitably
appear that the organism does not derive its true existence from such
a _manifold_ and its physical configurations. This is brought about by
the fact that the different parts, which are apprehended by us through
the senses, are at the same time conjoined together in one totality;
they appear consequently as the _members_ of one individual existence,
which is a unity of such differences, and which not merely possesses
them in their difference, but as parts of one homogeneous whole.