The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 1 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik
Georg Hegel · en
The same tendency is presupposed when, after an
examination of the form of any particular animal organism, an insect's,
for example, as subdivided into head, body, abdomen, and extremities,
we conclude the correlation of such parts to be based on a rational
principle, and are confident that though, at first blush, it may appear
quite accidental that we are in possession of five senses, we shall
discover a true bond of relation between that number and the notion
therein asserted. Of just this type is Goethe's method of observing
and accounting for the innate reason of Nature and her phenomena. With
an extraordinary intuitive sense he directed his attention directly
to[235] the objects of experience, entirely convinced of the ideal bond
of unity which explained their interconnection. History may be written
with a like object. The narration of facts and individual lives is
given in such a way as indirectly to throw a light on the essential
significance which such events or persons contributed to the period in
which they are necessarily bound together in one organic whole.
3. Consequently we may affirm that Nature generally, regarded as the
sensuous manifestation of the concrete notion and the Idea, is to
be considered an object of beauty in so far as by such a sensuous
perception of natural forms some kind of foreshadowing of the notional
unity consonant to them is surmised, and we are able through the
channels of sense to discover not merely their form, but somewhat of
the inner necessity which binds together all their parts. Further than
this incomplete surmise of the notion the sensuous contemplation of
Nature as beautiful is not carried. This way of comprehending things,
for which the separate parts, despite their appearance of independent
freedom among themselves, nevertheless reveal to the sight the harmony
that exists there either in the characteristics of _their form_, or
detached portions of it or their motion and so forth, remains for
all that _indefinite_ and _abstract._ The inward unity is not open
to external sense, nor can it appear in its ideal and concrete form
to such perception[236], whether imaginative or no; such at most
acquiesces generally in the universality of a law of connection
inherent in every living thing.