The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 1 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik
Georg Hegel · en
(_a_) And, in close connection with this inquiry into the
interpenetration through all parts of the animating soul, we may justly
ask ourselves, what precisely we understand under this conception
of a soul which is throughout visible: or to restrict attention to
definite limits we may inquire what are the specific characteristics
of the soul whereof art reveals to us the truest manifestation. For in
ordinary parlance one refers to the animating principle[271] peculiar
to metals, stones, wild animals, to say nothing of that belonging
to every kind of human character and its expressions. To natural
objects, however, such as stones and plants, the expression "soul" in
the complete acceptation of the term above mentioned is not strictly
applicable. Such soul as purely natural objects possess is entirely
finite, transitory, and rather a specific nature than a soul. The
determinate individuality of such existences is consequently completely
exposed in their finite existence; and, inasmuch as all that is
present there is a positive limit of restriction, such appearance as
there may be of a further claim to independence and freedom is only
an appearance; ideal characteristics which may indeed be imported
into them from without by means of art, but are not in the nature of
the objects by themselves. In the same way the soul of sense-feeling,
through which Nature manifests first the Life-principle only betrays
a subjective individuality, which still remains shut within itself,
unable to assert its reality in the further sense of a return upon
itself in a consciousness which shall attach to it the form of
infinity. Its content is, therefore, of a restricted nature, and its
manifestation in part the unrest, power of motion, sexual impulse,
anxiety or fear of the dependent life; and, in part, it is the mere
expression of an _inwardness_ capable of overcoming its finitude. The
animating life of Spirit (mind) brings us first into contact with the
free infinity capable within its own external and determinate existence
of remaining constant to the inner principle of unity, and, in the
act of expression, still reflected back upon its ideal substance. To
Spirit consequently is it alone permitted to impress the hall-mark of
its infinity and free self-recurrence on its external expression, even
though by such expression it enters the realm of narrow boundaries.
At the same time we may observe that Spirit, too, is only free and
infinite in so far as it truly apprehends its universality, and
deliberately posits for itself and accepts those ends which are
adequate to its own notion. Consequently, in so far as it fails to
grasp its own freedom it can only exist in a restricted content,
a character that is stunted, a temperament at once crippled and
superficial. In combination with nullity of this kind the manifestation
of Spirit must perforce remain wholly formal. We shall only find here
the abstract crust of self-conscious Spirit, whereof the content