The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 1 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik
Georg Hegel · en
Some may imagine it possible for the artist to compose the ideal
content of genuine types by a process of sifting and selection from
the facts of immediate Nature, or quite possibly from the various
physiognomies and compositions which collections of engravings from
the copper-plate or the wood may furnish. But a process such as this
of mere collection and sifting is not the end of the matter. An artist
must maintain the creative impulse alert throughout. He must himself,
in the strength of his own imagination, already impregnated with the
knowledge of appropriate form and made vital with profound experience
and emotion, give such an embodiment to the significance, which is the
inspiring motive of the work, as will make it appear throughout as
metal cast at one time and is one state of fusion.
B. THE DETERMINACY OF THE IDEAL
To comprehend the Ideal in its intrinsic significance, that is to say,
according to its fundamental notion, was a comparatively easy task. But
the beauty of art, in so far as it is the Idea, is not to be restricted
to the purely universal standpoint of its notional concept; even as
so comprehended it must necessarily include within it determination
and particularity, and is compelled to take definite embodiment as
external reality. The question consequently arises in what way is the
Ideal able still to assert itself in this process of objectification
in the medium of external things and their finitude, and despite all
that is antagonistic to ideality; and as a corollary to this we have to
inquire how finite and determinate existence is enabled to attach to
itself the ideality of the beauty of all art.
We propose to regulate this inquiry with the following division of our
subject matter.
_First_, the determination of the Ideal in its simplest terms.
_Secondly_, the determination of it, in so far as it proceeds by virtue
of its particularity to a condition of _discordant parts_ within itself
and to their resolution, a condition we may generally, define as
_action_[297].
_Thirdly_, the determination of the Ideal from the point of view of it
as an _external object._
I. THE IDEAL DEFINITION AS SUCH
1. We have already observed that it is the function of art to make the
Divine the focus or centre of its entire exposition. It is, however,
only possible for thought in its pure medium, that is to say, apart
from all the sensuous material of the figurative imagination, to
comprehend the Divine in its essential significance of _unity_ and
_universality._ To attempt to do otherwise, by imagining a picture of
God more readily grasped by the perception of the senses, is, as we
know, forbidden both Jews and Mahommedans. This cuts away the ground of
the figurative arts, which absolutely require form as their medium in
all its concreteness of actual life; and we have only lyrical poetry
left us to celebrate in its exaltation the praise of His power and
glory.