The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 1 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik
Georg Hegel · en
3. In conformity with what we have already advanced it is clear
that here, too, the Ideal will be most purely manifested in the
representation--whether it be of gods, Christ, apostles, saints, or
any other type of devout persons--which brings most clearly before
us the qualities of beatified repose and satisfaction, a peace
undisturbed with that which is earthly, and subject to the storms of
life's manifolded complexities, struggles, and contradictions. We are
therefore not surprised to find that both the arts of sculpture and
painting have been peculiarly fitted to incorporate under ideal form
not merely the ancient gods, but Christ as saviour of the world, and
individual apostles and saints. That which is the most essential truth
in actual life is concentrated to a focus on itself in the determinate
embodiment of art, rather than continually forced from its serenity
through dependence upon finite conditions. This essential concentration
is not destitute of particularity, but the divergent separation, which
is a feature of the external and finite state, is purified to one
simple definition, so that it appears as though all traces of external
influence and the relation thus created were overcome. This deedless
and infinite self-repose, this "taking a rest," as we find it, for
example, in certain statues of Hercules, is just what constitutes the
significance of the Ideal. If the gods are represented in contact with
the process of Nature, they must still carry with them their immortal
and unapproachable majesty. Jupiter, Juno, Apollo, Mars, and their
like are, it is true, definite personalities, but they are at the same
time unyielding potentates and powers, which preserve within them
their self-subsistent liberty, even when they are actively related
to the world. And for this reason it is not merely that a specific
particularity must characterize the determinacy of the Ideal, but
spiritual freedom must be manifested thereby as totality, and in this
state of repose suggest the potency of unfettered freedom of action.
If we turn now from the gods to the less exalted plane of temporal
existence and human life, we shall find the Ideal active in its
representation of the substantial content of such humanity, and its
dominant repression of wholly subjective particularity. By this we mean
that all that is entirely isolate in feeling and action is wrested from
the element of contingency, and particularity is represented in its
concreteness, that is to say in its wider bond of relation with what
most truly and intimately belongs to its life. When, for instance,
we speak of the nobility, excellence, or perfection in particular
men, we assert in so many words that the substantial core of what is
spiritual, ethical, and divine has announced itself as prevailing in
the individual, and man has submerged his active life, his volitions,
his interests, and passions wholly in this substantive basis, that he