The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 1 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik
Georg Hegel · en
excrescence; and if an attempt is made to assert it as though it were
still a valid means of attacking wrong, and assisting the oppressed, it
becomes simply an object of ridicule, such as Cervantes illustrates for
us in his "Don Quixote."
In this allusion to the opposition which exists between two
differently constituted _régimes_ of society and the collision which
results from action in defiance of their particular character we have
already indicated what we have above defined generally as the closer
determination and differentiation of the universal state of the world,
that is to say, the _situation_ as generally expressed.
2. THE SITUATION
The ideal world-condition which it is the function of art to present
in contrast to prosaic reality we may conclude from our previous
discussion to be merely a general background of society of a specific
kind; it is merely the _possible_ condition necessary for the
particular presentation, not the presentation itself. What we have
hitherto directed attention to is, in fact, the general background
upon which the living figures of art may appear. It is undoubtedly
fructified with individuality and is supported by its self-subsistency;
but as a _general_ condition it is not yet the active movement of
particular individuals in the very form of life, just as we may say
that the temple which Art erects is not as yet the representation of
the personal godhead, but only encloses the germ of the same. For this
reason we must in the first instance regard this world-condition as
a kind of medium in repose, a harmony, so to speak, of forces which
are operative in it, and to this extent it possesses a substantial
consistency of uniform worth, which, however, must not be accepted
as identical with what has been called "the age of innocence." For
it is a condition in the fulness and sovereignty of whose ethical
atmosphere the terrors of division only are slumbering because, in
our contemplation of it, we have before us, for the first time, the
aspect of its substantial unity, and consequently are only presented
with individuality in its most universal terms, a mode of viewing it
which makes it fade away as though without definition or any essential
disturbance of its unity, instead of giving to it the full value of
definite characteristics. But such characterization is essential to
individuality. And if the Ideal is to appear as _definite form_ it is
necessary for it to escape from such pure universality, or in other
words for it to give the universal a particular expression, and by so
doing impart to it both existence and appearance. Art consequently has
in this connection not only to translate into its medium a _universal_
world-condition, but must proceed beyond this quite indefinite
conception to the composition of pictures of _definite_ character and
action.