The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 1 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik — Georg Hegel — John Shaqi
The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 1 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik
Georg Hegel · en
Regarded from the aspect under which it affects _individual_ character
this general condition is the environment of circumstance which,
according to its specifically detached form, tends to excite both
collisions and development, forcing thereby the individuals thus
affected to express their _nature_ and exhibit such expression in a
definite form. From the point of view of the world-condition this
self-revelation of particular individuals appears as the passing of its
universality into the distinct embodiments of living individuality,
an aggregate over which _universal forces_ still assert the
_mastery._[311] For the eternal powers operative in the world-process
constitute the substantive content of the Ideal as specifically
defined in what it essentially is. The mode of existence, however,
which is realized through the bare form of external condition is
unworthy of this content. For in the first place such a condition is
associated with habit, and the habitual is no adequate determination
of those profounder interests which are active in _self-conscious
mind._ Furthermore, as we have observed, it was the _contingency_ and
_caprice_ of individuality, by virtue of whose spontaneous activity
these very interests are permitted to appear in life; but this
unessential contingency and caprice is again quite as little adequate
to the substantive universality, which constitutes the notion of
essential actuality. On these grounds respectively we are therefore
compelled to seek an art-envisagement more worthy and better defined
for the concrete content[312] of the Ideal.
This new configuration the universal powers can only retain in
its _determinate existence_ in virtue of the fact that they are
manifested in their essential modes of difference and movement, or,
to put the matter more specifically, through their assertion of the
contradictions which they relatively unfold. Two aspects of the
process of individualization into which the universal thus passes must
be here emphasized. In the first place, there is the _substance_ as
an embracing sphere of universal forces through the differentiation
indicated, which is broken from its substantive unity into its
component parts; secondly, there are the _individuals_, which spring
forth as the active completion of these forces and give to them a
specific objectification.