The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 1 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik
Georg Hegel · en
be noticed that Shakespeare, when referring to the apparition of the
ghost, contributes a far profounder trait of character in explanation
of this debated point. Hamlet delays, because he does not right off
wholly believe in the ghost.
The spirit that I have seen
May be a devil: and the devil hath power
To assume a pleasing shape; yea and perhaps,
Out of my weakness and my melancholy,
As he is very potent with such spirits,
Abuses me to damn me: I'll have grounds
More relative than this: the play's the thing,
Wherein I'll catch the conscience of the king.
In this passage it is obvious that the apparition as such does
not leave Hamlet merely devoid of all stability[350], but that he
entertains a reasonable doubt, and is determined to make his conviction
a certainty by his own experiments before he proceeds to act upon it.
(_γ_) As a summary description of these universal powers, which appear
not merely in their external independence, but are the vital and
moving forces in the human heart and all that is implied in its most
intimate life, we may borrow an expression in use among the ancients,
that is to say Pathos (_πάθος._) To translate this word adequately is
not easy. Passion almost always implies as its concomitant an element
of meanness or baseness. We contend in ordinary parlance that a man
should not surrender himself to his passions. It must therefore be
understood that we use the expression pathos in a nobler and more
universal sense than this without the slightest implication of anything
blameworthy or egotistic. The devoted love of the sister Antigone is
an excellent example of a pathos in the full significance of the Greek
use of the term. Pathos in this sense is a power of the emotional life
which completely justifies itself, an essential part of the content
of rationality and the free will. Orestes, for example, kills his
mother not so much on account of any force of his emotional life which
we strictly can call passion; rather it is a pathos in itself fully
considered upon and essentially sane which carries him on to the awful
deed. Thus understood we may add that it is impossible to say that the
gods possess pathos. They are merely the universal content of that
which is the stimulating energy in the resolves and actions of human
individuality. The gods as such continue in their repose and freedom
from passion, and however much they may quarrel or contend among
themselves, there is nothing really serious in it all, or their strife
possessed merely a symbolical significance in the view we may take of
it as a universal war of the gods. We must therefore strictly limit
pathos to the actions of mankind, and conceive thereunder the essential
or rational content, which is present in the human consciousness
identical with itself and throughout suffuses the emotional life.