The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 1 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik
Georg Hegel · en
(_αα_) We may say, then, that pathos constitutes the true mediating
link[351], the veritable domain of art. The representation of it is the
most truly effective part of a work of art, as it is its influence upon
those who look at it. Pathos sets a string in motion, which vibrates
through every human heart. Every one must know the type of worth and
reason, which underlies the content of a genuine example of pathos,
must recognize it at once when he sees it. And the cause of this is
that pathos moves us because it is that which is essentially the vital
force of our human existence. And it equally follows that that which
is wholly external, the natural environment and particular scene, in
its active support of the effect of pathos, need only be treated quite
subordinately. Nature must in consequence be drawn upon as a fact
essentially symbolical and suffer the pathos to re-echo from her walls,
which is the most real subject-matter of artistic representation.
Landscape is, for example, a type or genre of painting of less
importance than historical painting; but even there we find that the
school of landscape most independent should not be without a general
harmonic relation to human feeling, and, in fact, possesses a certain
type of pathos. In this sense we are told art generally ought to touch
the emotions. Before accepting this principle, however, we ought first
to inquire through what means this peculiar effect of art must be
brought about. "To touch the emotions" is in general the activity of
something in union with feeling, and mankind, more particularly the
mankind of to-day, are, or a more considerable portion of them are,
only too readily open to such experiments. The man who showers tears
on us, starts the seeds of tears, which grow up fast enough. In art,
however, only that ought to move us which contains in itself the real
import of pathos.